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People categorize objects more slowly when visual input is highly impoverished instead of
optimal. While bottom-up models may explain a decision with optimal input, perceptual
hypothesis testing (PHT) theories implicate top-down processes with impoverished
input. Brain mechanisms and the time course of PHT are largely unknown. This
event-related potential study used a neuroimaging paradigm that implicated prefrontal
cortex in top-down modulation of occipitotemporal cortex. Subjects categorized more
impoverished and less impoverished real and pseudo objects. PHT theories predict
larger impoverishment effects for real than pseudo objects because top-down processes
modulate knowledge only for real objects, but different PHT variants predict different
timing. Consistent with parietal-prefrontal PHT variants, around 250ms, the earliest
impoverished real object interaction started on an N3 complex, which reflects interactive
cortical activity for object cognition. N3 impoverishment effects localized to both
prefrontal and occipitotemporal cortex for real objects only. The N3 also showed
knowledge effects by 230ms that localized to occipitotemporal cortex. Later effects
reflected (a) word meaning in temporal cortex during the N400, (b) internal evaluation
of prior decision and memory processes and secondary higher-order memory involving
anterotemporal parts of a default mode network during posterior positivity (P600), and
(c) response related activity in posterior cingulate during an anterior slow wave (SW) after
700ms. Finally, response activity in supplementary motor area during a posterior SW after
900ms showed impoverishment effects that correlated with RTs. Convergent evidence
from studies of vision, memory, and mental imagery which reflects purely top-down
inputs, indicates that the N3 reflects the critical top-down processes of PHT. A hybrid
multiple-state interactive, PHT and decision theory best explains the visual constancy of
object cognition.
Keywords: category decision, categorization, identification, recognition, object constancy, visual perception,
event-related potentials, knowledge memory
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Introduction
People categorize objects accurately (e.g., car, dog, hat) even
when visual input is impoverished, for example, due to
fog, poor lighting, or unusual viewing angles. They show
remarkable visual constancy of categorization: People maintain
high accuracy despite suboptimal viewing conditions, though
performance is slower with impoverished than optimal visual
stimuli (Palmer et al., 1981; Tarr et al., 1998). Hierarchical
bottom-up processing along the ventral visual stream and
frontoparietal decision-making processes have well-established,
necessary roles in the visual constancy of category decisions
(Tanaka, 2003; Grill-Spector and Malach, 2004; Philiastides and
Sajda, 2007). However, recent evidence implicates additional
top-down feedback modulations onto posterior information
processing areas in order to explain human performance fully,
especially under more impoverished conditions (Kosslyn et al.,
1994), in which case bottom-up models underperform people
(Serre et al., 2007a).
This study aimed to address a critical unanswered issue of
when and how bottom-up processes and top-down feedback
contribute to visual category decisions. Most prior work focused
on functional anatomy using slow hemodynamic measures with
a time scale of seconds (Grill-Spector et al., 1999; Lerner
et al., 2001), but few used electromagnetic techniques with
high time resolution within the range of neural processing
(i.e., milliseconds), such as event-related potentials (ERPs), as
used here. Also, most studies and theories focus on object
cognition under optimal visual input. Consequently, the time
when the visual constancy of object cognition is achieved under
non-optimal conditions in humans has received relatively little
attention.
Timing is important because theories can be grouped into
two major classes based on time course, early or late: Early
theories propose an early time course within 130–215ms via
bottom-up (Thorpe et al., 1996) and/or top-down processes
(Bar, 2003), and late theories propose a later time course
and a key role for decision-making (Philiastides and Sajda,
2007) or top-down processes for attention (Stuss et al., 1992;
Ganis et al., 2007; Schendan and Lucia, 2010; Clarke et al.,
2011). Most vision theories, accounts, or models posit an
early time course. Bottom-up models are based on the initial
bottom-up pass through the ventral visual hierarchical pathway
(Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999) and posit early time courses
(Figure 1A). However, a bottom-up model cannot fully explain
the visual constancy of human object cognition (Serre et al.,
2007a). For example, on ultra rapid category detection tasks,
a name cues the target category before a masked image
appears brieﬂy (∼20ms) (Delorme et al., 2000). When masking
reduces feedback processing (Di Lollo et al., 2000), the initial
fast feedforward sweep along the ventral stream dominates
performance, consistent with computational models (Serre et al.,
2007a). Critically, however, such bottom-up models cannot
match human performance (a) when the mask is removed
and so feedback inputs are involved, or (b) when people see
the image longer before the mask appears (e.g., 80 vs. 50ms)
because then feedback inputs come into play long enough to
boost performance. Bottom-upmodels also perform poorly when
objects are impoverished (as by distance, i.e., farther away). Such
limitations led to the suggestion that the bottom-up pathway
could provide the initial input and object hypothesis to test using
top-down processes (Serre et al., 2007b).
Consequently, other early and late theories posit an important
role for feedback inputs. Most of these are perceptual hypothesis
testing (PHT) theories that propose iterative top-down processes
to achieve the visual constancy of object categorization. These
top-down processes include prediction of a tentative object
hypothesis based on prior information (e.g., memory) and
testing of these predictions using ongoing perceptual input.
Top-down processes are important when the stimulus input is
ambiguous or impoverished. This is because stimulus ambiguity
and impoverishment (e.g., due to rotation, deformation, and
illumination changes from one experience to the next) cause the
memory and currently perceived object to diﬀer substantially
in appearance (Ullman, 1996; Humphreys et al., 1997). This
can result in an initial mismatch to stored memory and
consequent failure of decision-making processes to categorize
the object based on initial bottom-up computations. Temporal
lobe, parietal, and prefrontal variants of PHT theories propose
diﬀerent mechanisms.
Temporal lobe variants (Figure 1B) capitalize on reciprocal
connections among ventral visual areas in which bottom-
up inputs automatically and reﬂexively trigger feedback from
higher-level areas down to lower areas (Bullier, 2001; Ganis
and Kosslyn, 2007). In such computational models (Ullman,
1996; Edelman, 1999), higher areas use stored knowledge to
reach a fast initial, broad classiﬁcation that feeds back to lower
areas. This ﬁrst top-down process interacts dynamically with
bottom-up perceptual information to reﬁne this classiﬁcation.
A second top-down process uses knowledge about the current
context, such as the surrounding scene (e.g., kitchen) or task
goal (e.g., ﬁnd the car), to further select the most appropriate
object model to feedback to lower level areas (Ullman, 1996).
In addition, reverse hierarchy theory (Hochstein and Ahissar,
2002) proposes further that, once the initial bottom-up pass
reaches advanced ventral visual areas, top-down processes for
selective attention bind sensory features, and conscious visual
perception begins (Treisman, 2006). Consequently, perceptual
hypotheses are generated that project back along the visual
hierarchy in reverse order to lower-level areas, which provide the
detailed information needed to test the hypotheses. Interactive
activation and competition theory (Humphreys et al., 1995,
1999) proposes further that these processes are task-dependent
(e.g., most important for object naming) and involve multiple
knowledge stores, which are themselves connected recurrently
within and between each other (Price et al., 1996): A structural
description system in left posterior inferotemporal cortex stores
knowledge about shape and interacts with a semantic memory
system, which, in turn, interacts with knowledge systems that
store the names and semantic classes (e.g., animal, vehicle, tool).
Parietal and parietal-prefrontal variants propose that the
ventral stream can support decisions about an object from
known views, but, when viewing an object from an angle that
impoverishes the image, additional spatial transformations must
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FIGURE 1 | Theories of visual category decisions. Timing estimates based on human brain electromagnetic potential data. Black arrows are bottom-up. Green
arrows are top-down. Dotted arrows are implied but not specified. Times in black are earliest time of bottom-up input to that region. Times in green are earliest time of
feedback input from nearest higher order area to that region. Times in magenta are when prefrontal top-down inputs interact with bottom-up and/or feedback
interactions along the visual pathways. Times in gray are associated with implied activity. Theories posit an early time course before 200ms (A–F) or a later time
course (G). (A) Bottom-up theories posit that the initial feedforward pass through the ventral visual pathway supports object cognition. According to decision theory,
this supports a category decision in lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC). In contrast, perceptual hypothesis testing (PHT) theories (B–G) emphasize top-down
contributions: (B) Temporal lobe variants assume bottom-up inputs along the ventral visual hierarchy trigger feedback along the pathway, which consequently
modifies bottom-up processing. (C) Parietal variants emphasize that the dorsal stream is necessary for complete object constancy. (D) One prefrontal variant posits a
role for top-down input from ventral LPFC (VLPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). (E) Temporal-prefrontal variants emphasize bottom-up and feedback processes
from visual areas along the ventral pathway through prefrontal cortex. (F) Parietal-prefrontal variants emphasize parietal-prefrontal processes of selective attention to
locations and features associated with an object category that have been cued by a search template prior to stimulus onset; this modulates visual processing early in
time from 80 to 200ms. (G) Late parietal-prefrontal variants emphasize parietal-prefrontal processes of selective attention that contribute model prediction and testing
processes when the category is not cued before stimulus onset; note, fMRI tests of parietal-prefrontal PHT variants implicate VLPFC in model prediction and testing
(Ganis et al., 2007; Schendan and Stern, 2008).
be computed, such as those implicated in mental rotation (Tarr
and Pinker, 1989; Turnbull et al., 1997; Gauthier et al., 2002).
These transforms align the percept and stored object knowledge
spatially (Bülthoﬀ et al., 1995) and may be implemented in
occipitoparietal areas along the dorsal visual stream. A parietal
variant predicts dorsal transforms are rapid, happening within
200ms (Figure 1C), because the dorsal stream processes visual
information faster than the ventral stream (Bullier, 2001). A
parietal-prefrontal variant involves mental imagery processes
implicated in mental rotation, which are slow because they
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involve top-down processes from prefrontal cortex after 200
or 500ms that are implicated in selective attention and model
veriﬁcation (see parietal-prefrontal theories below, Figure 1G)
(Schendan and Kutas, 2003; Schendan and Lucia, 2009).
While temporal and parietal variants imply a role for
prefrontal cortex, prefrontal variants specify such a role. One
prefrontal variant (Figure 1D) assumes that people routinely
accomplish object cognition within about 200ms using low
spatial frequency information from V2/V4 to compute a coarse
scene representation along the dorsal pathway (Bar, 2003). This
representation is sent forward rapidly into Brodmann’s area
(BA) 45 of ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and then
orbitofrontal cortex, which uses this information to predict
possible categories within 130ms after visual stimulation and
feeds these back to fusiform cortex in the ventral stream
within 180–215ms (Bar et al., 2006). Other prefrontal PHT
variants can be summarized within a free-energy type framework
(Friston, 2010). Of these, temporal-prefrontal variants focus
on ventral stream and prefrontal interactions (Figure 1E). For
example, in hierarchical Bayesian models (Lee and Mumford,
2003), bottom-up processes (e.g., ventral stream) can yield a
perceptual hypothesis that serves as a predictive code to test using
information coming in from the stimulus (e.g., to prefrontal
cortex). In contrast, parietal-prefrontal variants implicate top-
down selective attention processes, which involve interactions
between parietal and prefrontal cortex (Spreng et al., 2013). For
example, in one such variant (Figure 1F), dorsolateral prefrontal
area 46 feeds back a signal to visual areas that competitively biases
processing of features at the attended location that match the
search template for the object (Deco and Rolls, 2004). Spatial
biases feedback via the dorsal pathway, and object biases feedback
via the ventral pathway. This model aims to explain cognition
when the location or object is cued before the stimulus and so
attention can modulate early visual processing within 200ms (Di
Russo et al., 2003). In contrast, other models explain category
decisions without cueing and implicate processes primarily after
the initial bottom-up activation of the ventral stream, that
is, after 200ms (Figure 1G). For example, model veriﬁcation
theory (Lowe, 2000) proposes that, for a slightly impoverished
image, the bottom-up pass can suﬃce to match the percept
to the correct model, whereas for a more impoverished image
(e.g., degraded picture), the bottom-up pass may only ﬁnd a
weak match to knowledge (or initial classiﬁcation Ullman, 1996)
that is insuﬃcient for an accurate decision. Consequently, top-
down processes implicated in selective attention perform model
veriﬁcation to determine the knowledge in posterior cortex
that best explains the percept. A prediction process selects the
locations of salient features, evaluates their match to knowledge,
and generates a prediction about a candidate object model (e.g.,
a category). A testing process, which may involve parietal spatial
transformation and mental rotation processes (e.g., as in some
parietal vision theories), evaluates the predicted model for its
ﬁt with the percept. An adaptive resonance variant provides
important computational solutions for how such processes may
operate (Fazl et al., 2009), such as a mismatch reset signal from
prefrontal cortex that controls prediction and testing cycles until
enough evidence accumulates for a decision.
While vision and decision theories have evolved separately,
both explain category decisions under uncertainty due to
impoverished sensory input, and decision theories specify roles
for prefrontal and parietal cortex. Evidence accumulation is
a core process in decision-making theories (Ratcliﬀ, 1978),
which oﬀer mathematical solutions for how frontoparietal
areas accumulate and evaluate evidence for a decision (Gold
and Shadlen, 2007). As perceptual impoverishment increases,
decision certainty decreases, and decision processes are recruited
more. Decision theories explain decision processes based on
information from perception (Gold and Shadlen, 2007), category
knowledge (Philiastides and Sajda, 2007), and recognition
memory (Ratcliﬀ, 1978). Decision accounts propose that
prefrontal and parietal cortices accumulate evidence from ventral
areas via bottom-up inputs (Philiastides and Sajda, 2007), making
them bottom-up theories (like Figure 1A or the bottom-up
pathways in Figure 1F). Critically, the brain regions and event-
related potentials (ERPs) associated with category decisions
and impoverishment eﬀects on visual cognition are similar
(e.g., Schendan and Kutas, 2003; Ganis et al., 2007; Jiang
et al., 2007; Schendan and Stern, 2008; Wheeler et al., 2008).
Findings from the present study favor a hybrid decision and
parietal-prefrontal PHT theory in which both bottom-up and
top-down interactions occur between prefrontal decision and
posterior evidence components of the brain’s decision network
(Figure 1G).
In summary (Figure 1), vision and decision theories diﬀer
in involvement of parietal and prefrontal cortex and various
top-down processes, which predicts diﬀerent time courses. All
propose object constancy of category decisions within 200ms,
except for parietal-prefrontal PHT theories that propose that,
when the category is unknown before stimulus onset, interactive
bottom-up and feedback processes from the visual pathways into
lateral prefrontal cortex between 200 and 900ms support object
constancy.
The present study aimed to deﬁne the time course of category
decisions under uncertainty due to impoverished visual input. To
do so, ERPs were recorded using the paradigm from an fMRI
study (Ganis et al., 2007) that uniquely manipulated both visual
impoverishment and knowledge and found evidence favoring
parietal-prefrontal PHT and decision theories (Philiastides and
Sajda, 2007). Subjects decided whether they could categorize
more (MI) and less (LI) impoverished drawings of real objects
and pseudo versions of them, which diﬀer in knowledge
activation. FMRI activation is greater for MI than LI images, and
more so for real than pseudo objects in the VLPFC (BA 45 and
47/12), occipitoparietal, and occipitotemporal object processing
areas implicated in selective attention, spatial transformation,
and category decisions. Critically, this impoverished-real-object
eﬀect implicates not only perceptual processing but also the
knowledge activation needed for PHT and a category decision.
After all, by design, real objects activate knowledge, whereas
the novel shapes of pseudo objects do so minimally if at all
(Kroll and Potter, 1984). Thus, impoverishment eﬀects for both
object types reveal perceptual processing, whereas those for real
more than pseudo objects reﬂect knowledge processing, thereby
distinguishing between the contributions of sensory-perceptual
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1289
Schendan and Ganis Top-down categorization processes after 250ms
vs. knowledge (i.e., memory) evidence used for PHT and a
category decision. Critically, the fMRI pattern for impoverished
real objects refutes a purely bottom-up account of object
constancy, which predicts the opposite impoverishment eﬀect
(i.e., greater activation for LI images, regardless of object type,
because LI images have more perceptual features). Moreover,
when top-down processes for visuospatial working memory
cannot be engaged fully in a category decision, performance is
impaired with MI (but not LI) objects (Ganis et al., 2007). Thus,
altogether, convergent evidence indicates that impoverished-real-
object eﬀects reﬂect top-down contributions, not only bottom-up
input, to PHT and category decisions.
This design improves upon electromagnetic brain potential
studies on object constancy, decisions, and category knowledge in
four ways as follows. (1) It manipulates both impoverishment and
object type (i.e., knowledge). Previously, either impoverishment
of real objects in fragmented drawings (Viggiano and Kutas,
2000; Schendan and Kutas, 2002, 2007a; Schendan and Maher,
2009) and rotated views varied (Schendan and Kutas, 2003)
or categorization success (knowledge) varied between stimuli
(Holcomb and McPherson, 1994; Schendan et al., 1998;
McPherson and Holcomb, 1999; Gruber and Müller, 2005, 2006;
Gruber et al., 2006; Sehatpour et al., 2006, 2008; Schendan and
Maher, 2009; Voss et al., 2010). (2) Pseudo objects here had been
constructed from the real objects to equate them on low-level
features, perceptual properties, and coherent object structure,
and, in work with these intact versions, ERPs diﬀer only after
175ms when initial bottom-up processing is largely complete,
conﬁrming matched low-level sensory attributes between types
(Schendan et al., 1998). Other studies compared real objects
relative to either pseudo objects chosen from a diﬀerent set
of real objects that were unknown to subjects (Holcomb and
McPherson, 1994; McPherson and Holcomb, 1999) or distorted
or scrambled versions that are unknown (Gruber and Müller,
2005, 2006; Busch et al., 2006; Gruber et al., 2006; Sehatpour
et al., 2006, 2008), or compared objects with less than more
novel or meaningful visual structures (Daﬀner et al., 2000a;
Folstein and van Petten, 2008; Voss et al., 2010). Notably,
despite these visual diﬀerences, all these studies conﬁrm ERP
eﬀects only after 175 or 215ms, suggesting that knowledge
is the primary factor distinguishing real and pseudo objects.
(3) This experiment assessed many categories, whereas ERP
work on category decisions focused on face-selective activity
with cars as the comparison category (Philiastides et al., 2006;
Philiastides and Sajda, 2006, 2007). (4) There is no repetition
confound. Here, subjects categorize each object once, instead
of repeatedly at multiple levels of impoverishment (Stuss et al.,
1986; Doniger et al., 2000; Viggiano and Kutas, 2000; Schendan
and Kutas, 2002; Philiastides and Sajda, 2006; Ratcliﬀ et al.,
2009). This is important because repetition aﬀects behavior (i.e.,
priming) and ERPs, making them more positive after 200ms
(Schendan and Kutas, 2003, 2007a; Henson et al., 2004; Schendan
and Maher, 2009), and these eﬀects are larger for meaningful
than meaningless objects (e.g., real vs. pseudo) (Snodgrass
and Feenan, 1990; Schendan and Kutas, 2002; Schendan and
Maher, 2009; Voss et al., 2010). Further, repetition eﬀects diﬀer
between impoverishment levels, being largest at moderate levels
(Snodgrass and Feenan, 1990) and when objects repeat from LI
to MI than MI to LI (Schendan and Kutas, 2003).
The time when ERPs show the impoverished-real-object eﬀect
deﬁnes when PHT and decision processes contribute to the
visual constancy of category decisions based on knowledge, not
just sensory evidence. To infer the timing of cortical sources,
ERP results were integrated with fMRI location information by
both estimating the ERP sources and relating similar functional
patterns between methods (Luck, 1999). To use vision and
decision theories to predict the ERP eﬀects, this report capitalizes
on the multiple-state interactive (MUSI) account of the brain
basis of visual object cognition to deﬁne the times and scalp
sites to analyze (Schendan and Kutas, 2003, 2007a; Schendan
and Maher, 2009; Schendan and Ganis, 2012). This framework
proposes that posterior object processing areas activate at
multiple times in brain “states” serving distinct functions. This
account extends the principle that diﬀerent brain areas can
perform diﬀerent functions for cognition at diﬀerent points in
time because bottom-up, feedback, and recurrent activity alters
neuronal computations, as demonstrated, for example, in visual
area V1 (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000). Likewise, object-sensitive
areas perform diﬀerent functions in perception and cognition
due to diﬀerent neural computations associated with bottom-up,
feedback, and recurrent activity (Schendan and Lucia, 2010).
State 1: Initial activity in object processing areas feeds
forward from occipital to temporal cortex between
∼120 and ∼200ms when a visual object is broadly
perceptually categorized (e.g., as a face instead of
nonface object) (Schendan et al., 1998; Schendan and
Ganis, 2013), as described for ventral visual hierarchy
processing (Figures 1A,B, 11). This state is indexed by
early ERPs reﬂecting activity in object-sensitive areas
related to categorical perception: the vertex positive
potential and its occipitotemporal N170 counterpart
(VPP/N170) (Schendan and Lucia, 2010). When input
is optimal, this predominantly bottom-up activation of
knowledge should be suﬃcient (Serre et al., 2007a) to
enable object cognition (i.e., entry level categorization)
and phenomenological awareness of this knowledge in
State 2 with little or no need for additional top-down
processing from prefrontal cortex (Schendan and Kutas,
2007a).
State 2: Object processing areas activate again interactively due
primarily to top-down processing among these areas
and VLPFC as well as other areas such as parietal
cortex (Schendan and Lucia, 2009). This is indexed by
mid-latency negative ERPs between 200 and 500ms:
an N3 complex (including components known as
template matching N2[00], N300, N350, frontal N400).
The N3 is the ﬁrst ERP in response to pictures
that modulates according to cognitive factors aﬀecting
posterior object processing cortex and VLPFC similarly
(Barrett and Rugg, 1990; Zhang et al., 1995; McPherson
and Holcomb, 1999; Doniger et al., 2000, 2001; Curran
et al., 2002; Schendan and Kutas, 2002, 2003, 2007a;
Folstein and van Petten, 2004, 2008; Philiastides and
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Sajda, 2006, 2007; Philiastides et al., 2006; Sehatpour
et al., 2006; Gratton et al., 2009; Schendan and Lucia,
2009, 2010) and that localizes to these brain areas (David
et al., 2005, 2006; Sehatpour et al., 2008; Schendan
and Maher, 2009; Schendan and Lucia, 2010; Clarke
et al., 2011; Bastin et al., 2013). States 1 and 2 are thus
described in the time course for late parietal-prefrontal
PHT theories (Figure 1G) and are consistent with these
ideas for the ﬁrst 500ms of visual processing.
State 3: Top-down interactive processes, including conscious,
eﬀortful, cognitive control functions, perform internal
evaluation, and veriﬁcation after about 400 to 500ms.
For example, (a) a parietal P600 (or P3[00]) component
reﬂects later strategic evaluation or veriﬁcation of earlier
category decision processes, being more positive for
correct decisions, and strategic, eﬀortful mental rotation
of objects, being larger when more mental rotation
is needed, and (b) a parietal late positive complex
(LPC) complex is associated with higher-order semantic
analysis, being larger when semantic integration is more
challenging (i.e., contextually incongruous) (Schendan
and Lucia, 2009; Schendan and Maher, 2009; Sitnikova
et al., 2010).
For each theory, Table 1 summarizes the predictions for the
pattern of ERP eﬀects, and the MUSI framework speciﬁes
the ERPs, eﬀects, and their direction. Posterior cortex theories
(Figures 1A–C) predict only early eﬀects. SeeTable 1 (VPP/N170
predictions i): All vision theories in Figure 1 predict the same
impoverishment and type eﬀects between 130 and 215ms. This
is explained by the bottom-up processes in these theories.
Bottom-up processing (e.g., Figure 1A) predicts overall less
neural activity for MI than LI objects and for pseudo than
real objects (i.e., independent impoverishment and type eﬀects)
during the initial bottom-up pass through the ventral stream in
state 1. The impoverishment eﬀect happens because MI objects
show fewer visual features and so they activate fewer neurons
and/or activate each neuron less, relative to LI objects. The type
eﬀect happens because the initial pass categorizes by activating
knowledge, which is less successful for pseudo than real objects,
by design. Altogether, this predicts that the VPP/N170 will be
larger for LI thanMI and for real than pseudo objects (seeTable 1
Bottom-up).
See Table 1 (predictions ii): Temporal, parietal, and prefrontal
variants of top-down PHT theories (Figures 1B–D, respectively)
predict, in addition, early impoverished-real-object eﬀects (see
Table 1 Temporal and Parietal, and Prefrontal) due to feedback
at this time; note, for one prefrontal variant (Bar, 2003), this
interaction eﬀect will be found as long as MI stimuli contain
suﬃcient low spatial frequency information to compute a coarse
object representation along the dorsal stream.
See Table 1 (Prefrontal; predictions iii): Prefrontal PHT
variants can accommodate (Figures 1D–F) or predict
(Figure 1G) later type and impoverishment eﬀects. For
example, one early prefrontal PHT variant can accommodate
additional late type and impoverishment eﬀects (see bottom-up
inputs to AIT and VLPFC in Figure 1D). Type eﬀects occur
at later times when meaning is activated after categorization
TABLE 1 | Predicted pattern of impoverishment (I) and type (T) effects according to vision and decision theories and summary of ERP results.
Predictions Theory Results
ERP Effect Direction Bottom–up Top–down perceptual hypothesis testing/decision
Early Early Late
Temporal Temporal and Parietal Prefrontal Parietal–prefrontal MUSI and Decision
i VPP/N170 I LI Larger X X X X – –
i 145–160ms T Real larger X X X X – X?
ii I × T I Larger for real – X X – – –
iii N3 I MI larger – – ? X X X
iii 200–500ms T Real larger – – ? X X X
iv I × T I larger for real – – – X ? X
iii P600 I LI larger – – ? X X X
iii 500–900ms T Real larger – – ? X X X
iv I × T I Larger for real – – – X ? X
SW I LI larger X
700–900ms T Real larger X
I × T – X
Figure 1A Figures 1B,C Figures 1D–F Figure 1G Figures 1G, 11 Figure 11
LI, less impoverished; MI, More impoverished; MUSI, Multiple State Interactive account of visual object cognition; X, predicted effect; ?, consistent but not specifically predicted; X?,
Spurious effect due to low level sensory differences. N400 (300–500ms) predictions and results are the same as for the N3. LPC (late positive complex) predictions and results are the
same as for the P600. Early prefrontal theories include early prefrontal, temporal-prefrontal, and parietal-prefrontal as in Figures 1D–F.
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(Bar et al., 2006). Also later during post-categorization times,
high spatial frequencies have a role (Bar, 2003), predicting
impoverishment eﬀects at later times due to less power at high
spatial frequencies in MI than LI pictures. Early temporal-
prefrontal and parietal-prefrontal PHT variants (Figures 1E,F)
can likewise accommodate late type and impoverishment
eﬀects based on post-categorization processes. However, as
categorization is already done, none of these predict late
impoverished-real-object eﬀects. Only late parietal-prefrontal
PHT theories predict late type and impoverishment eﬀects,
as these propose that knowledge activation for the category
decision with MI objects continues to be attempted after
the initial bottom-up pass, that is, after 200ms. The MUSI
framework (Table 1) predicts the direction of these late ERP
eﬀects. Late ERPs will be more negative for MI than LI stimuli
(impoverishment eﬀect) and for real than pseudo objects (type
eﬀect); in other words, the N3 will be larger for MI stimuli
and pseudo objects, whereas the P600/LPC will be larger for LI
stimuli and real objects. This is due to stronger activation of
memory for real than pseudo objects and LI than MI stimuli.
This direction of impoverishment eﬀects on the P600/LPC is
also predicted by the slow mental rotation process in some
parietal-prefrontal PHT variants (Figure 1G) because negativity
is greater for more than less rotated objects (i.e., impoverished
regarding match to memory) during mental rotation (Schendan
and Lucia, 2009).
See Table 1 (predictions iv): Late parietal-prefrontal PHT
variants (Figure 1G) assume that bottom-up processing before
200ms (as in Figure 1A) provides the front-end to later top-
down processes, which predict later impoverished-real-object
eﬀects after 200ms. The interaction eﬀect would happen when
prefrontal cortex biases attention (Deco and Rolls, 2004) or
uses attention processes to control prediction and testing
cycles (Lowe, 2000; Fazl et al., 2009). A later time course
is consistent with ERP evidence for feature search along the
ventral stream between 150–200 and 300–450ms (Luck, 2006).
By some accounts, the interaction happens when late mental
rotation processes in frontoparietal cortex are recruited (Tarr
and Pinker, 1989; Schendan and Stern, 2008). This predicts
the interaction after 200ms in state 2 during the N3 when
parietal feedback interactions compute spatial relations among
object parts and, especially after ∼500ms in state 3 during
the P600/LPC when spatial transformations implicated in
mental imagery of object rotation happen (Schendan and Lucia,
2009). Note, some temporal-prefrontal PHT variants (Figure 1E,
Humphreys et al., 1997; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002) and
decision theories can suggest an add-on of later selective
attention processes that would essentially be the samemechanism
described in parietal-prefrontal PHT theories (Figure 1G) and
so could accommodate late type and impoverishment eﬀects
and their interaction. In addition, because these theories use
a bottom-up model as the front end to hypothesis testing
(e.g., model veriﬁcation) or decision processes, they predict
the same pattern of early eﬀects as bottom-up models: Early
impoverishment and type eﬀects. They also predict no early
interaction eﬀects because frontoparietal contributions happen
later.
The MUSI framework and decision theories predict type and
impoverishment eﬀects only during later ERPs. MUSI predicts
this because category decision processes happen after the initial
bottom-up pass after 200ms (Schendan and Maher, 2009).
Decision theories predict this due to bottom-up accumulation of
evidence in frontoparietal areas implicated in decision-making
and task diﬃculty between 200 and 450ms during the D220 and
late component (Philiastides and Sajda, 2007), which correspond
to components of the N3 complex. MUSI and decision theories
do not predict but can accommodate late impoverished-real-
object eﬀects, as both posit late prefrontal activity, and MUSI
posits further that prefrontal top-down processes are critical
for category decisions. Finally, note, most vision theories, other
than parietal and parietal-prefrontal PHT theories, were created
to explain cognition with optimal input so are problematic for
predicting eﬀects with MI stimuli and pseudo objects, but it is
important to attempt to make explicit predictions in order to test
the strengths and limitations of these theories.
For completeness, we assessed two other late ERPs that
modulate during category decisions. Later in state 2, the
centroparietal N400 between 300 and 500ms reﬂects interactive
activation of semantic memory, especially meaningful knowledge
associated with linguistic stimuli (e.g., a name), in anterior
temporal cortex and VLPFC (Marinkovic et al., 2003; Lau et al.,
2008; Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). Only parietal-prefrontal PHT
and decision theories posit a role for word meaning, which
is knowledge that can contribute to category decisions and
prediction. Hence, the N400 will be more negative for MI than
LI and for real than pseudo objects and show impoverished-real-
object eﬀects, like the N3 and P600/LPC (Table 1). Also, a broad
slow wave (SW) starting around 700ms has been associated
with response planning for category decisions, including naming,
being more positive for named than unnamed objects (Schendan
and Kutas, 2002, 2003; Folstein et al., 2008; Schendan and Lucia,
2009; Schendan and Maher, 2009; Sitnikova et al., 2010). This
predicts greater SW positivity for LI than MI and for real than
pseudo objects, but no interaction, as the SW reﬂects processes
after the category decision.
Materials and Methods
Methods were the same as for the event-related fMRI version
(Ganis et al., 2007) except for modiﬁcations needed for ERPs.
Materials
Fragmented drawings from the Snodgrass andVanderwart (1980)
set depicted 128 real objects and 64 pseudo versions of them.
For a prior ERP study (Schendan et al., 1998), we created
pseudo objects by rearranging parts of the real objects into
perceptually closed objects that could exist in a Euclidean
3-dimensional world but not be categorized. Findings show
processing diﬀerences between the matched sets of the intact real
and pseudo objects only after 175ms during the N3 complex,
conﬁrming that, as designed, real, and pseudo objects are well-
matched for low-level visual feature processing. All drawings
were impoverished by deleting random squares of pixels across
8 fragmentation levels in a series using the algorithm of Snodgrass
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et al. (1987). Levels 1 (intact) to 6 (most fragmented) were
used here. Such random impoverishment methods have the
following advantages. First, fragmentation is not determined
by a theory that could bias the features and properties in the
stimuli, it does not depend on subjective judgments, and it
produces stimuli that are challenging to categorize. Second, the
stimuli do not depend upon uncontrolled variations in individual
perceptual processing, as when visual input is impoverished by
short presentation duration (Snodgrass et al., 1987; Snodgrass
and Corwin, 1988a). Third, no masking is used that could limit
top-down processes (Di Lollo et al., 2000). Of 260 fragmentation
series for real objects, Snodgrass and Corwin (1988a) produced
150, and the ﬁrst author produced 110 using the same software
for a prior study (Schendan and Kutas, 2002). Two hundred
of these series were chosen for the behavioral study that
accompanied the fMRI version and generated normative data
(Ganis et al., 2007) that were then used to choose 128 series,
each of which had 2 fragmentation levels (low vs. high) that
met two criteria: (1) At least 75% of people named each object
correctly at both levels based on naming norms. (2) For each
object, response times (RTs) were faster numerically for the
low than high fragmentation level. Of these 128, 96 were from
the Snodgrass and Corwin (1988a) set. Low fragmentation was
intended for the LI condition; high fragmentation was intended
for the MI condition. For pseudo objects, the same software
fragmented these images to the same level as their corresponding
real objects. These methods produced list I and its three orders
used for fMRI (Ganis et al., 2007), and, for this ERP version, we
added a second list (II): An object (real or pseudo) depicted at
a higher fragmentation level in one list was presented instead at
a lower fragmentation level in the other list, and vice versa (i.e.,
level 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 in list I became level 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 in list
II, respectively). Each list was shown in 3 pseudo-random orders
of intermixed, real, and pseudo objects counterbalanced across
subjects. Based on normative data (Snodgrass and Vanderwart,
1980), stimuli chosen for the MI and LI real object conditions,
respectively, did not diﬀer in visual complexity (2.9 vs. 2.9), name
agreement (86 vs. 87%), image agreement (3.7 vs. 3.6), familiarity
(3.4 vs. 3.2), name frequency (18 vs. 15), and acquisition age (2.6
vs. 2.8).
Pseudo objects served two goals. First, they enable an
impoverished-real-object eﬀect to be revealed. By design
(Schendan et al., 1998), these pseudo-objects match real
object versions in low-level features, perceptual properties,
and coherent object structure but, unlike real objects, activate
knowledge weakly, if at all. Second, they served as catch trials to
ensure that people categorized the real objects. Pseudo objects
cannot be categorized by design, enabling subjects who do not
reliably discriminate real and pseudo objects to be excluded.
Catch trials validate the key press reports objectively and
independently. While overt naming unambiguously reveals
categorization accuracy (Schendan and Maher, 2009), it has the
disadvantages of (a) demanding additional lexical retrieval not
required for categorization per se (Damasio et al., 1996) and (b)
introducing movement artifacts. Importantly, key press reports
of categorization are reliable (Snodgrass and Yuditsky, 1996),
and ERP eﬀects are similar for key press and naming measures
of categorization (Schendan and Maher, 2009). The design
aimed to equate numbers of categorized and uncategorized
trials so as not to discourage people from trying to categorize.
While this necessitated using half the number of trials for
pseudo relative to real objects, ample trials remained for valid
ERPs in all conditions, as conﬁrmed by visual inspection to
ensure reliable waveforms from each subject. However, real
and pseudo versions therefore also could not be presented in
matched yoked pairs, as in our prior work showing no ERP
eﬀects before 175ms (Schendan et al., 1998). Therefore, while,
for completeness, the present study assesses ERP type eﬀects
before 175ms, these likely reﬂect low-level feature diﬀerences,
not just knowledge. Consequently, we focus conclusions on type
eﬀects after 175ms that replicate those with the fully matched set
(Schendan et al., 1998) and any impoverished-real-object eﬀects
(i.e., impoverishment by type interaction). Further any such
interactions will be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
Design and Procedure
A 2× 2 repeated measures factorial design (Figure 2A) included
factors of impoverishment (LI,MI) and object type (real, pseudo).
General health history and Edinburgh Handedness (Oldﬁeld,
1971) questionnaires were administered before each session. The
ERP session started with instructions on the computer screen
that subjects paraphrased aloud, and any misconceptions were
corrected. They were instructed on the task, to maintain eye gaze
on the ﬁxation mark at the center of the screen, and blink only in
the ﬁxation period. They then received 10 practice trials using the
experiment methods but diﬀerent stimuli. On each experiment
trial, a ﬁxation period of 5400–5700ms preceded each picture,
which was presented for 1000ms while subjects decided whether
they could categorize each object. They pressed “1” as soon as
they knew what the object was, or “2” if they did not know, as
quickly as possible without sacriﬁcing accuracy. Participants were
informed that categorization would be challenging by design
because the images were degraded. They were not informed that
some objects were impossible to categorize (i.e., pseudo objects)
and so, from the subjects’ perspective, pseudo objects were just
images that they could not categorize (i.e., possible “real” objects
that they failed to categorize).
Electroencephalography (EEG)
The ERP System software (Holcomb, 2003) presented stimuli
and recorded and analyzed data on PCs running Windows
XP. A Belkin Nostromo game pad detected responses. EEG
data were recorded at 200Hz (bandpass 0.01 to 100Hz; SA
Instrumentation Company) from 60Ag/AgCl electrodes attached
to a plastic cap (Figure 2B). Cap, nose, and right mastoid
electrodes and one below the right eye (monitoring eye blinks)
were referenced to the left mastoid. Bilateral eye electrodes
(monitoring eye movements) were referenced to each other.
Using ERP System software and standard methods (Luck,
2005), 27% of EEG trials were excluded from analysis that
contained above threshold blinks (determined for each individual
participant, and based on polarity inversion between the lower
eye and right frontopolar electrode 4), eye and other movement
artifacts (based on peak to peak amplitude for the bilateral
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FIGURE 2 | Method and performance. (A) A 2× 2 repeated measures
design was used with impoverishment (less, more) and object type (real,
pseudo) as factors. Fragmented line drawings of real and pseudo objects were
shown. Pseudo objects had been created by re-locating the local parts of
each real object to create a closed, perceptually coherent but unknown more
global shape that could exist in a Euclidean 3-dimensional world but cannot be
categorized (Schendan et al., 1998). Subjects pressed “1” to report that they
categorized the object or, if not, they pressed “2,” as soon as possible after
the picture appeared. A median split of the RTs to real and pseudo objects,
separately, for correct responses (i.e., 1 for real objects, 2 for pseudo objects)
separated these conditions into more (MI) and less (LI) impoverished
(Continued)
FIGURE 2 | Continued
conditions. Shown are real objects of an LI fish at fragmentation level 3, and MI
piano at level 4, and an LI pseudo-fish at level 5, and MI pseudo-piano at level
4; note, sample stimuli reflect the consistent finding that more fragmented real
objects are related to slower RTs, whereas more fragmented pseudo objects
are related to faster RTs. Stimuli subtended 6 by 6 degrees of visual angle, on
average, with a visual contrast of approximately 30% (dark pixels against a
brighter background). (B) Custom 60-channel geodesic montage for EEG
recording (Electrocap International). Circles show electrode locations.
Numbers label each electrode. Approximate locations of 10–20 sites are
shown in gray italics; site 57 is at Cz, site 60 is Oz; pairs 31–32, and 49–50 are
1 cm below the inion. (C) Response times to MI and LI real and pseudo
objects. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval (Morey, 2008).
*Significant impoverishment effect.
eye electrodes and individual electrodes, respectively), muscle
activity (based on high frequency local peaks within a time
period). ERPs were calculated oﬄine by averaging artifact-free
EEG in each condition, time-locking to object onset with a
100ms pre-stimulus baseline, and re-referencing to the mean
of both mastoids. To compare with some prior studies, ERPs
were also re-referenced to the common average of all electrodes,
except bilateral eyes, and plotted positive up, which highlights
the resemblance between frontopolar N3 eﬀects with the mastoid
reference (e.g., site 3) and occipitotemporal positivity (“P3”)
eﬀects with the common average reference (e.g., site 22).
Analyses
Accuracy and the RTs and ERPs on correct trials were
analyzed. “Correct trials” for real objects corresponded to
“categorized” responses (i.e., hits). “Correct trials” for pseudo
objects corresponded to “not categorized” responses (i.e., correct
rejections). For each subject, the RT median for real and pseudo
objects, separately, split trials into MI (slower) and LI (faster)
conditions, which was the main analysis in the fMRI version
and found to be most valid way to subdivide the trials to reveal
impoverishment eﬀects (Ganis et al., 2007). For the fMRI version,
data were also re-analyzed using fragmentation level to deﬁneMI
and LI conditions, revealing the same results as for themedian RT
split, though slightly less signiﬁcant, consistent with the known
performance variability among fragmentation series (Snodgrass
and Corwin, 1988a). Consequently, categorization performance
(i.e., median RT split), as opposed to fragmentation level, best
captures the full set of image characteristics that deﬁnes each
stimulus’ goodness (i.e., impoverishment) for a category decision:
Individual RT captures all factors that impoverish each picture
and aﬀect the category decision, and the results deﬁne the full
range of processes that contribute to the visual constancy of
object cognition. Thus, for completeness, as for fMRI, data were
analyzed in two additional ways: (a) over fragmentation levels
and (b) RT median split for only levels 3, 4, and 5 for which
average visual complexity was equated between the MI and LI
sets. For the latter (b), median RTs were re-computed for levels
3–5 and trials split into MI and LI conditions, accordingly: 98 of
128 real objects in list I; 75 of them in list II (fewer due to the
level switch); for correct trials after artifact rejection, about 52
real and 39 pseudo object trials were analyzed from each subject
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on average. For the former (a), to assess whether results would
change if fragmentation deﬁned MI and LI levels, ERP data were
re-analyzed using fragmentation level to deﬁne MI (levels 4–5)
and LI (levels 2–3) conditions; these levels yielded similar trial
numbers in each condition, while also minimizing perceptual
diﬀerences betweenMI and LI trials. Indeed, as for fMRI, the ERP
results deﬁned using fragmentation replicated those using the RT
deﬁnition (both all trials and levels 3–5). In sum, regardless of
how impoverishment is deﬁned, results remained the same. As
results of all analyses did not diﬀer, the best controlled analysis
that yielded the largest eﬀects (i.e., RTs for levels 3–5) is reported.
Mean ERP amplitudes, time windows and electrodes were
chosen based on prior ERP studies of vision and categorization;
all components analyzed here have known scalp distributions
(Picton et al., 2000; Luck, 2005): (a) From 145 to 160ms assessed
the VPP/N170 (Schendan and Lucia, 2010). (b) The N3 complex
is a negative-going ERP over frontal locations that can sometimes
invert polarity over occipitotemporal locations between 200 and
700ms with a peak typically around 350ms. As the N3 complex
has subcomponents that can diﬀer over time, the frontal N3 and
its occipitotemporal counterparts were assessed from 200 to 299,
300 to 399, and 400 to 499ms; note, the 300 to 499ms times
also assessed the centroparietal N400 (Schendan and Maher,
2009). (c) From 500 to 699ms assessed the P600, (d) 700 to
899ms assessed the SW, and both these time periods after 500ms
also assessed the LPC. Focal spatiotemporal planned contrast
ANOVAs isolated eﬀects (df s[1, 18]) to lateral pairs or midline
sites and times when an ERP was maximal and overlapped least
with others: (a) 145 to 160ms for the VPP at pair 29–30, and its
polarity inverted N170 at occipitotemporal pair 33–34; (b) 200
to 299, 300 to 399, and 400 to 499ms for frontopolar ERPs at
pair 3–4 and occipitotemporal polarity inverted counterparts at
pair 21–22, and 300 to 399 and 400 to 499ms for frontocentral
negativities at pair 29–30; (c) pair 47–48 from 300 to 399 and 400
to 499ms for the centroparietal N400; (e) pair 53–54 from 500 to
699 and 700–899ms for the parietal P600 and broad LPC; (d) 500
to 699 and 700 and 899ms for the SW at frontocentral pair 11–
12 and broad LPC. The Bonferroni method corrected for planned
comparison of multiple sites within a time period by dividing the
alpha of 0.05 for each time period by the number of sites tested
(Table 3).
Mixed ANOVAs included 2 Impoverishment (MI, LI) × 2
object Type (real, pseudo) within-subjects factors and between-
subject nuisance variables of list (I, II) and order (A, B, C) of no
interest and not reported. For ERP ANOVAs, a within-subjects
factor of electrode was added, and midline (labeled as such) and
lateral electrodes (unlabeled) were analyzed separately to assess
hemispheric asymmetries with an added within-subject factor
of hemisphere in lateral ANOVAs, and, in midline ANOVAs,
lobe (parietal [sites 57, 58], occipital [59, 60]). The Huynh–
Feldt correction was applied for violations of the sphericity
assumption. For brevity, only results for critical factors of
impoverishment and type, and their interactions are reported,
as scalp location eﬀects alone are not of theoretical interest.
Degrees of freedom (df s) are listed with the ﬁrst report of each
eﬀect. Planned simple eﬀects tests assessed the impoverishment
by type interaction for focal results, which target speciﬁc ERP
components.
Source Estimates
Theoretically, the inverse problem of localizing the cortical
sources of electromagnetic data recorded from the scalp
has no unique solution. Standardized low resolution brain
electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) estimates the sources
(Pascual-Marqui, 2002). The sLORETA software computes the
three-dimensional (3D) distribution of current density using a
standardized, discrete, 3D distributed, linear, minimum norm
inverse solution. Localization is data-driven, unbiased (even with
noisy data), and exact but has low spatial precision due to
smoothing assumptions resulting in highly correlated adjacent
cortical volume units. A realistic head model constrains the
solution anatomically using the structure of cortical gray matter
from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) average of 152
human brains as determined using the probabilistic Talairach
atlas. Images plot the exact magnitude of the estimated current
density based on the standardized electrical activity in each of
6239 voxels of 5mm3 size. The sLORETA software computed
the sources of the grand average ERPs over all sites, except nose,
and eyes (Pascual-Marqui, 2002). Electrode coordinates were
digitized using an infrared digitization system, and imported into
LORETA-Key software. This coordinate ﬁle was then converted
using the sLORETA electrode coordinate conversion tools. The
transformation matrix was calculated with a regularization
parameter (smoothness) corresponding to a signal-to-noise ratio
of 50. We localized the diﬀerence waves of each of the 4
eﬀects (Figure 7). The ERP diﬀerence data are akin to the signal
diﬀerences between fMRI conditions and so limit sources to those
that could reﬂect fMRI activation, and diﬀerence waves may
reveal weaker sources better (Luck, 2005).
Subjects
Ethical approval granted through the Institutional Review Board
of Tufts University. Participants were 39 healthy Tufts University
students or people from the greater Boston community. 1 person
was excluded due to a data recording error and another due
to strabismus. Data were analyzed from 24 of the 37 subjects
remaining who met the following inclusion criteria: (a) The d′-
value was 1.0 or better (µ = 2.35) based on the hit rate for
real objects, and false alarm rate to pseudo objects out of the
total trials eliciting a response (i.e., excluding ambiguous no
responses). (b) Two-thirds or more of real and pseudo object
trials were correct to ensure valid RTs and ERPs following artifact
rejection. (c) Visual inspection of each subject and condition
conﬁrmed each ERP was valid (µ = 28 and 26 trials, respectively,
at levels 3–5) (Picton et al., 2000). The analyzed group was half
female, aged µ = 21.2 years (range 18.0–29.8), had education
µ = 14.4 years (range 12–20), and handedness score µ = 97.8
(right-handed).
Results
Performance
Performance replicated the fMRI version (Ganis et al., 2007).
Results of signal detection theory (SDT) analyses with logistic
distributions (Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988b) validated category
decision accuracy. Subjects reliably decided that real objects
were categorized and pseudo objects were not. The average
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discrimination index (d′L) was 4.13 (corrected rates: 73.6%
hits, 6.9% false alarms), demonstrating very high detection of
knowledge conveyed by real objects. The average criterion (CL)
was 0.97, which was above the neutral 0 level [t(23) = 7.80, p <
0.001], indicating subjects were slightly biased to be conservative
in reporting detection of knowledge. Subjective probability that
each picture could be categorized can aﬀect ERPs, such as P300-
like potentials (e.g., P600, LPC) (Johnson, 1986), so, to assess this,
response rates were computed collapsed across both object types
(real, pseudo). Results showed that subjects decided that they
could categorize about half of the pictures: 50.0% categorized vs.
49.0% uncategorized [levels 3–5, F(1, 18) = 0.13, p = 0.72]. This
50:50 decision rate demonstrates that subjective probability of
response type (and picture categorizability) cannot explain ERP
eﬀects.
RTs (Figure 2C) were faster in LI than MI conditions, by
design, F(1, 18) = 182.83, and for real than pseudo objects,
F(1, 18) = 25.14 (ps < 0.0001). LI were faster than MI, but more
so for pseudo than real objects, resulting in an Impoverishment
by type interaction, F(1, 18) = 9.25, p = 0.007. Since
this could be due to the overall slower RTs for pseudo than
real objects, normalized RT scores (MI-LI/MI) were analyzed,
demonstrating that impoverishment eﬀects were actually greater
for real (score = 0.36) than pseudo objects (score = 0.33),
F(1, 18) = 6.09, p = 0.024. Results do not reﬂect speed-accuracy
trade-oﬀs, because RTs and accuracy for real objects did not
correlate across subjects (r = 0.14, p > 0.5). Analyses of the
relation between fragmentation level and RT conﬁrmed that, as
designed, RT correlated with fragmentation level for real objects,
r = 0.61, p < 0.001.
ERPs
The aim was to determine when impoverishment and object
type interact such that the impoverishment eﬀect is larger for
real than pseudo objects. Table 1 summarizes ERP results, which
were most consistent with late parietal-prefrontal PHT, MUSI,
and decision theories. After 200ms, impoverishment aﬀected
knowledge activation, modulating the N3 complex, N400, P600,
and SW (Figures 3, 4); note, as results suggested no distinct LPC
eﬀects, henceforth, we refer only to the P600 and the SW.
N170/VPP
From 145 to 160ms, omnibus results showed that object type
interacted signiﬁcantly with lateral and midline electrode sites
(Table 2). Focal spatiotemporal analyses showed a marginal type
eﬀect at frontocentral pair 29–30 (Table 3) where positivity was
slightly greater for real than pseudo objects.
N3 Complex and N400
Omnibus results at N3 and N400 times from 200 to 500ms
(Table 2) showed signiﬁcant eﬀects of type and impoverishment.
Most important, impoverishment by type interactions were
signiﬁcant at lateral sites the entire time from 200 to 500ms and
at the midline from 400 to 500ms.
N3 complex (200–500ms)
Focal spatiotemporal results demonstrated that the frontal
N3 was more negative for (a) MI than LI stimuli for real
objects only (Figures 3, 5A) and (b) pseudo than real objects
on LI more than MI trials (Figures 3, 5B). Occipitotemporal
counterparts showed the same but with opposite polarity (i.e.,
more positive). Speciﬁcally, the results (Table 3) showed main
eﬀects of type were signiﬁcant the entire time from 200
to 500ms at frontopolar, frontocentral, and occipitotemporal
sites. Main eﬀects of impoverishment were signiﬁcant at
frontopolar sites the entire time, frontocentral sites from 400
to 500ms, and occipitotemporal sites from 200 to 300ms. The
critical impoverishment by type interactions were signiﬁcant at
frontopolar sites from 300 to 400ms; note, interactions were
marginal at other times frontally and occipitotemporally from
200 to 300ms. Planned contrasts (Table 3) showed that only real
objects had signiﬁcant impoverishment eﬀects during the entire
frontopolar N3 (200 to 500ms) and later frontocentral N3 (300
to 500ms); note, this eﬀect was marginal on the occipitotemporal
N250 from 200 to 300ms. Further, type eﬀects were signiﬁcant,
for LI, at all times and N3 sites and, for MI, from 200 to 400ms
at frontopolar sites and all times at occipitotemporal sites; note,
for MI, type was marginal at frontocentral sites. With a common
average reference, N3 eﬀects split about evenly between frontal
and occipitotemporal sites (Figures 4, 5C,D).
N400 (300–500ms)
Focal results demonstrated that the N400 was less negative
for LI real objects than all other stimuli, demonstrating
impoverished-real-object eﬀects (Figures 3, 4, 6). Speciﬁcally, the
results (Table 3) showed signiﬁcant impoverishment eﬀects at
centroparietal pair 47–48 from 400 to 500ms, though type eﬀects
and the impoverishment by type interaction were marginal.
Planned contrasts (Table 3) supported the critical interaction, as
impoverishment was signiﬁcant for real objects only, and type
was signiﬁcant for LI stimuli only. Notably, while the earlier
frontal N3 showed type eﬀects for both MI and LI stimuli, type
eﬀects between 400 and 700ms at the parietal N400 and P600
sites, occurred only for LI objects, dissociating the frontal and
parietal ERPs.
P600/LPC (500–700ms)
Around 500ms, N3 complex eﬀects ended, and the parietal P600
showed impoverished-real-object eﬀects, as the impoverishment
eﬀect was larger for real than pseudo objects. Positivity was
greater for LI than MI stimuli and for real than pseudo objects,
and the impoverishment eﬀect was larger for real than pseudo
objects (Figures 3, 6). With a common average reference, a left
mid-parietal P600 inverted polarity to an N600 at right frontal
sites (Figure 4). Accordingly, omnibus results from 500 to 700ms
resembled those from 400 to 500ms, demonstrating type and
impoverishment eﬀects and their interaction (Table 2).
Focal results (Table 3) at parietal pair 53–54 showed
signiﬁcant eﬀects of impoverishment and type, though their
interaction was marginal. Planned contrasts (Table 3) showed
impoverishment was signiﬁcant for both object types for the
ﬁrst time between 500 and 700ms, as earlier ERPs showed
impoverishment eﬀects only for real objects. Further, type
was signiﬁcant for LI stimuli only. These results conﬁrm the
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FIGURE 3 | ERP effects of impoverishment and object type. Grand average ERPs at all channels show effects of impoverishment (more [MI], less [LI]
impoverished) and object type (real, pseudo). Unless otherwise specified, ERPs in this and following figures were low-pass filtered at 30Hz and were referenced to the
average of left and right mastoids. Numerals label electrode locations; ns, nose. Impoverishment and object type modulated the N3 complex (including P250/N250
and D220 components; components inverted polarity between frontal and occipitotemporal sites), N400, P600, and slow wave (SW) components after 200ms, but
not the earlier VPP/N170.
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FIGURE 4 | ERP effects of impoverishment and object type with common average reference. As in Figure 3, grand average ERPs are plotted at all sites,
but, in order to compare with other work, the reference was computed using the average of all scalp sites (i.e., the “average reference”), and ERPs were instead
plotted positive up. ERP effects of impoverishment (more [MI], less [LI] impoverished) and object type (real, pseudo) are shown. Compared with Figure 3, with the
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FIGURE 4 | Continued
average reference, here, the parietal P600 inverts polarity over lateral frontal and frontopolar sites to an N600, especially at the right. The late SW from 500 to 900ms
has an occipital distribution that inverts polarity over frontocentral sites near the midline, and is larger over the left hemisphere. Note, with the common average
reference, the N400 pattern (gray shadow) cannot be discerned from the overlapping N3 and P600 times, highlighting the importance of using the same reference
sites across studies to identify components and draw conclusions; studies analyzing data using the common average reference may misattribute N3 and/or P600
effects to the N400.
TABLE 2 | F–values for significant effects in omnibus lateral (Lat) and midline (Mid) ANOVAs with impoverishment and object type factors at each time
period after 200ms.
ERP VPP/N 170 N3 N3 and N400 P600 SW
Time (ms) 145–160 200–300 300–400 400–500 500–700 700–900
Source Lat Mid Lat Mid Lat Mid Lat Mid Lat Mid Lat Mid
Impoverishment (I) – – – – – – 15.0** 19.8** 38.1** 49.7** 11.9** –
Type (T) – – – – 6.3* 4.4* 14.2** 17.8** 23.0** 30.0** 112.3** 46.8**
I × Hemisphere (H) – – – – – – 5.8*
I × Electrode (E) – – 5.1** – – – 2.8* – 4.8** – 5.2* 13.2**
I × Lobe (L) – – – – – – 16.1**
I × L × E – – – – 7.4* 14.3** 7.0*
T × E 4.57** 8.03* 35.7** 28.4** 48.6** 52.7** 22.3** 20.9** 32.8** 32.5** 54.4** 81.3**
T × E × H – – 3.0** 2.5** 3.4** 4.2** 2.1*
T × L – 10.2** 40.1** 45.4** 14.2** 50.0** 81.9**
T × L × E – – – – 11.1** 39.8* 5.7*
I × T – – 10.6** – 5.5* – 9.1** 5.3* 5.4* 5.1* – –
I × T × E – – – – – – – – – 5.1* – 7.6*
I × T × L × E – – – – 5.4* 8.6** –
df (1, 18) for lateral effects of I, T, I × T, I × H, and all Midline effects and their interactions; df (27, 486) for Lateral Electrode effects and their interactions. Times rounded to nearest
5ms. Epsilon values for lateral sites at each time period (start-end time in ms): 145–160 (T × E = 0.132), 200–300 (T × E = 0.16; I × E = 0.16; T × E × H = 0.27), 300–400 (T × E =
0.17; T × E × H = 0.35), 400–500 (T × E = 0.20; I × E = 0.16; T × E × H = 0.22), 500–700(T × E = 0.21; I × E = 0.12; T × E × H = 0.25), 700–900(T × E = 0.15; I × E = 0.10; I
× T × E = 0.12; T × E × H = 0.32). −p > 0.05; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
impoverished-real-object eﬀect on the P600 and dissociate it
from other ERPs.
SW/LPC (500–900ms)
Around 700ms, positivity on a broad anterior SW was greater
for LI real objects than MI ones, which was greater than for
LI pseudo objects than MI ones, and type eﬀects continued
(Figure 3). With a common average reference, the SW was a
negativity at occipital sites that inverted polarity to positivity over
mid-frontal sites (Figure 4). Omnibus results from 700 to 900ms
(Table 2) showed impoverishment and type eﬀects continued,
but the impoverished-real-object eﬀect was only at the midline
where the impoverishment by type by electrode interaction was
signiﬁcant due to impoverishment eﬀects for real but not pseudo
objects at central more than posterior midline sites.
Focal results at frontocentral pair 11–12 (Table 3) showed
eﬀects of type and impoverishment from 500 to 900ms, and
impoverishment and type interacted marginally from 700 to
900ms. Planned contrasts (Table 3) showed impoverishment was
signiﬁcant for real objects from 500 to 900ms and marginal for
pseudo objects from 500 to 700ms (LPC time only). Further,
unlike the N400 and P600, the N3 and SW showed type eﬀects
for both LI and MI stimuli. Thus, no distinct LPC eﬀects were
observed, and the anterior SW from 700 to 900ms showed
impoverishment eﬀects for real objects only.
N3 Onset
To deﬁne precisely when the impoverished-real-object eﬀect
starts, the onset of N3 eﬀects was deﬁned as the time when 15
consecutive points ﬁrst become signiﬁcant in a series of point-
by-point F-tests (Picton et al., 2000) at focal frontopolar pair
3–4 and right occipitotemporal site 22, as frontal N3 eﬀects
were bilateral and occipitotemporal N250 eﬀects were larger
on the right. The criterion was met for the onset of type
eﬀects with LI stimuli by 230ms. However, omnibus and focal
results conﬁrmed type and impoverishment eﬀects during the
N3 so it is informative to consider fewer consecutive times.
The results thereby also suggested an onset around 250ms for
the impoverished-real-object eﬀect when the most consecutive
signiﬁcant points showing this interaction were at frontopolar
site 3 (7 points, ps < 0.05, plus 1, p = 0.084). Simple eﬀects
tests deﬁned the start of impoverishment eﬀects for real objects
likewise as 255ms at frontopolar site 4 (site 3 onset at 245ms,
13 points, ps < 0.05, plus 2, ps < 0.064). Type eﬀects started
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FIGURE 5 | ERP effects of impoverishment and object type on the N3 complex. (A,B) Shown are sites of the N3 complex maxima (left frontopolar site 3, right
frontocentral site 30, right occipitotemporal site 22). Frontal effects inverted polarity to positivity at occipitotemporal sites, especially on the right (“P3[N3]” maximal at
site 22), including an N250; note, a D220 index of task difficulty for decisions also inverted polarity between frontocentral and occipitotemporal sites. (A) N3 effects of
impoverishment shown for real objects and pseudo objects. The frontal N3 showed an impoverished-real-object effect, including a frontopolar P250 component: The
frontal N3 components were more negative for MI than LI real objects but not pseudo objects; note, the N3 showed no such effect for pseudo objects, but, in contrast,
briefly at the peak, the N3 was instead slightly more negative for LI than MI pseudo objects. The occipitotemporal N250 but not later posterior N3 counterparts showed
impoverishments effects for real objects. (B) N3 effects of object type shown on LI and MI trials. The N3 complex was larger for real than pseudo objects, and this
type effect was larger on LI than MI trials. (C,D) To compare with other publications, the reference was computed using the average of all scalp sites (i.e., “common
average reference”), and ERPs were plotted positive up. Shown are left frontopolar site 3 and occipitotemporal site 22. (C) N3 effects of impoverishment shown, for
real and pseudo objects. (D) N3 effects of object type shown on LI and MI trials. Here, with the average reference, the effects over occipitotemporal sites become
larger than when the bilateral mastoid reference is used instead (see A,B): Notice the similarity of effects between frontopolar site 3 in (A,B) and occipitotemporal site
22 here [also site 22 in (A,B) is more like site 3 here]. Crucially, the frontopolar ERPs with a mastoid reference [e.g., P250, N3 in (A,B)] correspond, with the average
reference shown here, to the occipitotemporal ERPs (e.g., N250, P3(N3) at site 22 here). This demonstrated a clear link between the present and prior research on the
frontocentral N3 complex and its subcomponents, and prior research on the occipitotemporal N250 and Ncl, which were defined using the nose or average reference,
(Continued)
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FIGURE 5 | Continued
as shown here; note scalp distribution shapes with nose and average reference are similar. Like the frontopolar P250/N3 with the mastoid reference (see
A,B), here with an average reference, the occipitotemporal N250 and P3(N3) show the impoverished-real-object effect, being more positive for MI than LI
real objects but not pseudo objects, and this effect inverts polarity over frontopolar sites to P250 and N3 effects. Further, like the frontopolar P250 and N3
with the mastoid reference (see A,B), here with an average reference, the occipitotemporal N250 and P3(N3) show object type effects, being more positive
for pseudo than real objects on LI and MI trials, and these effects invert polarity over frontopolar sites. The whole head ERPs in Figure 4 demonstrate
that this polarity inversion of effects occurs between frontal sites toward the midline (3–4, 11–12, 19–20, 29–30) and more lateral occipitotemporal sites
with a right hemisphere maximum (22, 32, 34), especially for the N250, consistent with the known right lateralization of the N250 (i.e., N250r).
around the same time posteriorly regardless of impoverishment
but ∼50ms later on the frontopolar N3 for MI relative to LI
stimuli: It started for LI stimuli between 230 and 250ms (all sites)
and, for MI stimuli, from 215 to 220ms at occipitotemporal site
22 and later at 270ms at frontopolar site 4 (14 consecutive points)
and 280ms at frontopolar site 3 (7 points, ps < 0.019, plus 1,
p = 0.051). Altogether, these onsets suggest that impoverishment
starts to modulate knowledge around the time when knowledge
starts to contribute to the category decision:∼250ms.
Cortical Sources
For the four diﬀerence waves (Figure 7), cortical sources
were estimated. The main focus was the time of the N3
peak from 300 to 400ms (Figures 8A–D). Sources of this
impoverishment eﬀect (MI vs. LI) for real objects localized
to occipitotemporal and lateral prefrontal areas found with
fMRI (Ganis et al., 2007), whereas, for pseudo objects,
impoverishment diﬀerences localized only to prefrontal areas.
Sources of the object type eﬀects (real vs. pseudo) on both
LI and MI trials were in occipitotemporal areas. Sources at
other times were also estimated. At all times after 200ms,
type eﬀects continued in the same occipitotemporal areas
(Figures 8C,D,G,H). Impoverishment sources varied over time
and with object type (Figures 8A,B,E,F). The 200 to 300ms
time during the P250/N250 component showed the same
impoverished-real-object pattern of sources as the peak N3 time
period. Later, from 400 to 500ms when the N3 ends and the
N400 peaks, impoverishment eﬀects for real objects showed only
the occipitotemporal source (see intracranial ERP in Figure 8A).
Around 450ms, the maximum source shifted to anterotemporal
cortex for both real and pseudo objects, suggesting an additional
contribution from this region to the N400. From 500 to 700ms,
the estimated intracranial ERP for the anterotemporal source
resembled the scalp P600 impoverishment waveform, which
is maximal at this time, and more mediotemporal sources
also contributed (Figures 8E,F). From 700 to 900ms when the
late SW dominates, anterotemporal impoverishment activity
continued only for real objects. In addition, for both object types,
impoverishment eﬀects now appeared in the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC; Figures 8E,F).
Later ERPs Related to RTs
For completeness and because RTs occurred after the SW, cortical
dynamics closer to the motor response were also assessed.
EEG was re-analyzed to reject artifacts both between 900 and
1400ms post-stimulus and during a pre-stimulus baseline of
−100 to 100ms. Analysis times from 900 to 1099ms captured
most MI real object RTs, and 1100 to 1400ms captured most
MI pseudo object RTs. Results showed anterior SW eﬀects of
impoverishment continued until 1099ms and type until 1400ms.
Greater positivity was also found on a left mid-occipital-parietal
slow wave (pSW) forMI than LI real objects from 900 to 1400ms,
which inverted polarity anteriorly, and the pSW showed type
eﬀects for MI trials until 1099ms (Figures 9A,B). Critically, no
impoverishment by type interactions were found after 900ms.
Both times showed main eﬀects of type and impoverishment
laterally, and type at midline sites (Fs > 10.70, ps < 0.005), and
type and impoverishment each interacted with lateral electrode
(Fs > 4.33), type with midline electrode and with lobe (Fs >
29.33), and impoverishment with midline electrode by lobe (Fs
> 28.76), ps < 0.003. From 900 to 1099ms, results also showed
interactions of impoverishment by hemisphere, by midline
electrode, by lobe (Fs > 5.4), by electrode by hemisphere (F =
2.19), ps < 0.04, and by Type by midline electrode (F = 9.74,
p = 0.006). Focal simple eﬀects tests on frontal SW pair 11–12
showed all impoverishment and type eﬀects were signiﬁcant from
900 to 1099ms and both type eﬀects from 1100 to 1400ms (Fs>
4.51, ps < 0.05). Parietal pair 51–52, where the pSW was large,
showed impoverishment by hemisphere for real objects from 900
to 1400ms (Fs> 5.22), and type onMI trials from 900 to 1099ms
(F = 4.68), ps< 0.05.
A correlation analysis across subjects explored the relationship
between RTs and impoverishment eﬀects at pSW parietal pair
51–52 from 900 1400ms. Results showed that RT and ERP
impoverishment eﬀects from 900 to 1099ms for real objects
correlated signiﬁcantly for the pSW eﬀect at both 51 and 52
(rs > 0.43, ps < 0.035). From 1100 to 1400ms, RT and ERP
impoverishment eﬀects for pseudo objects correlated at site 52
(r = 0.473, p = 0.02). As the pSW became more positive, RTs
became slower (Figure 9C).
sLORETA on this data revealed brain sources from 900ms
onwards (Figure 9D) in supplementary motor area (SMA),
which was activated in fMRI (Ganis et al., 2007).
Fragmentation Level ERPs
The results so far used the median split of RTs to deﬁne
MI and LI conditions. In a separate analysis of ERPs until
900ms, fragmentation levels 4–5 deﬁned the MI condition
and levels 2–3 deﬁned the LI condition (Figure 10). Results
of the fragmentation level analyses replicated all results from
the RT split analyses. It may be noted that impoverishment
eﬀects for real objects were slightly smaller with fragmentation
level deﬁning impoverishment, but this would be expected.
After all, the most and least fragmented images were excluded
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FIGURE 6 | Effects of impoverishment and object type on the N400
and P600. Grand average ERPs at focal sites of the centroparietal N400
and parietal P600 plotted negative up. N400 and P600 impoverishment
effects shown for (A) real objects and (B) pseudo objects. (C) N400 and
P600 object type effects shown on LI and (D) MI trials, which showed no
type effect. From 400 to 700ms, impoverished-real-object effects were
found on the N400 and P600. Positivity was greater on LI than MI trials,
and this impoverishment effect was larger for real than pseudo objects,
which showed no such effect on the N400. The P600 was the first ERP
to show impoverishment effects for both real and pseudo objects and in
the same direction.
from this fragmentation based analysis but included in the RT
based analysis and so stimulus diﬀerences were smaller with
fragmentation instead of RT deﬁning impoverishment. Further,
as RT must completely capture all stimulus impoverishment that
aﬀects RTs, impoverishment eﬀects should be larger for results
based on RTs than any single factor such as fragmentation.
From 200 to 400ms, the critical impoverishment by type
interaction was found (200–300ms: x lateral electrode, F = 4.5,
p = 0.002; 300–400ms, F = 16.1, p = 0.001; x lateral
electrode, F = 7.98, p <.001; 300–400ms: midline, F = 7.15,
p = 0.015; x electrode, Fs > 8.54, ps < 0.009), as well as Type
and Impoverishment main eﬀects and/or their interactions with
scalp site (200–300ms: Fs > 3.04, ps < 0.02; midline, Fs > 4.95,
ps < 0.04; 300–400ms: Fs > 2.13, ps < 0.04; midline, Fs > 8.41,
ps< 0.01). Focal results at frontopolar N3 pair 3–4 showed eﬀects
of type (Fs > 35, ps < 0.001) and impoverishment by type (Fs >
5.07, ps< 0.04), and simple eﬀects tests showed impoverishment
for real objects from 300 to 400ms (Fs > 8.59, ps < 0.009),
impoverishment for pseudo objects from 200 to 400ms (Fs >
4.98, ps< 0.04), and type on LI and MI trials from 200 to 400ms
(Fs> 6.15, ps< 0.03). Occipitotemporal pair 21–22 showed type
eﬀects from 200 to 400ms (Fs > 5.93, ps < 0.03), and, from 200
to 300ms, impoverishment by type (F = 5.84, p = 0.026). From
300 to 400ms, the frontocentral N3 (pair 29–30) showed eﬀects
of type (Fs > 6.85, ps < 0.02), and impoverishment by type (Fs
> 17.97, ps < 0.001), and simple eﬀects tests showed eﬀects of
impoverishment for both objects (Fs> 6.85, ps< 0.02), and type
on LI trials (Fs> 25.3, ps< 0.001).
From 400 to 700ms, the critical impoverishment by type
interaction was found on the P600 (Fs > 16.61, ps < 0.001;
x lateral electrode, Fs > 2.82, ps < 0.02; midline, Fs > 6.86,
ps < 0.02; x electrode, Fs > 5.17, ps < 0.03), as well as
Type and Impoverishment main eﬀects and their interactions
with electrode (Fs > 4.81, ps < 0.05; midline, Fs > 7.84, ps
< 0.02). Focal results from 400 to 500ms showed type and
impoverishment main eﬀects at frontopolar pair 3–4 (Fs > 25,
ps < 0.01), and a marginal impoverishment by type interaction
(F = 3.82, p = 0.066), and occipitotemporal pair 21–22 showed
a type eﬀect (F = 15.71, p < 0.001). The frontocentral N3
(pair 29–30) showed eﬀects of type (Fs > 12, ps < 0.003), and
impoverishment by type (Fs > 10.79, ps < 0.005), and simple
eﬀects tests showed impoverishment for real objects, and type for
LI trials (Fs> 4.56, ps< 0.048). Focal results from 500 to 700ms
at P600 (pair 55–56) showed eﬀects of type (Fs > 56.95, ps <
0.001), impoverishment by type (Fs > 25.58, ps < 0.001), and
type by hemisphere (F = 6.97, p = 0.017), and simple eﬀects
tests showed impoverishment eﬀects for both types, and type on
only LI trials (Fs> 13.22, ps< 0.002).
From 700 to 900ms, the critical impoverishment by type
interaction was also found (x lateral electrode, Fs = 2.62, p =
0.044; midline, Fs = 7.89, p = 0.012; x lobe, F = 9.9, p = 0.006),
as well as Type and/or Impoverishment main eﬀects and their
interactions with electrode (Fs > 2.16, ps < 0.03; midline, Fs >
4.88, ps< 0.04). Focal results at frontocentral pair 11–12 showed
eﬀects of type (F = 137.35), p < 0.001), and impoverishment by
type (F = 5.33, p = 0.04).
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FIGURE 7 | Grand average difference ERPs computed by subtracting ERPs in two conditions. For display, waves were low pass filtered at 20Hz.
(A) Difference waves of impoverishment effects. Effects of impoverishment shown by subtracting the less impoverished (LI) condition from the more
impoverished condition (MI). Up is negativity in MI greater than LI. Note, where the impoverishment difference wave was greater for real than pseudo
objects reveals the impoverished-real-object effect. (B) Difference waves of object type effects. Effects of object knowledge shown by subtracting the real
object condition from the pseudo object condition. Up is negativity for pseudo greater than real objects.
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FIGURE 8 | The sLORETA maps show estimated sources of the difference waves (Figure 7) between two conditions (impoverishment = MI minus LI;
type = pseudo minus real) in the grand average ERPs. Maps shown superimposed on an inflated, canonical MNI152 (Colin) brain. Dark areas are sulci; light
(Continued)
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FIGURE 8 | Continued
areas are gyri. L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere. Each brain shows standardized cortical current density distributions, and source activity reflects the location of
differential source activity between conditions but not the direction of effects. Scale uses hot colors (red, yellow) for maximal current density value differences. (A–D)
N3 Sources. sLORETA maps shown for the N3 from 300 to 400ms on dorsal (top) and ventral (bottom) cortical surfaces. Estimated intracranial ERPs plotted on the
left for prefrontal (MNI x y z coordinates −15 20 65) and occipitotemporal sources (55 −45 –25) between −100 and 500ms. (A) N3 impoverishment sources for real
objects. Occipitotemporal sources: inferior (BA 20, 60 −40 −20; BA 37, 55 −45 −25) and middle temporal (BA 21, 65 −35 −15; BA 20, 55 −40 −15), fusiform (BA
37, 50 −50 −25; BA 20, 55 −35 −25; BA 19, 45 −70 −20; BA 36, 45 −40 −25), middle occipital (BA 19, 50 −70 −15), lingual (BA 18, 15 −85 −20), and
parahippocampal (BA 36, 40 −30 −25) gyri. Prefrontal sources: superior (BA 6, −15 20 65; BA 8, −25 30 55), middle (BA 6, −25 20 60; BA 9, −35 40 40), and
inferior frontal (BA 47, 20 25 −20) gyri. (B) N3 impoverishment sources for pseudo objects. Same prefrontal sources as for real objects. (C) N3 object type sources for
LI. Occipitotemporal sources: fusiform (BA 37, 55 −60 −20, −50 −60 −25; BA 36, 45 −40 −30; BA 19, −50 −70 −20), inferior temporal (BA 20, 50 −55 −20; −60
−55 −20), middle temporal (BA 37, 55 −55 −15, −55 −65 −15; BA 21, 65 −50 −10), middle occipital (BA 37, 50 −65 −15, −50 −65 −15; BA 19, 50 −75 −15),
parahippocampal (BA 19, 35 −45 −10) gyri. (D) N3 object type sources for MI. Same occipitotemporal sources as for LI. (E–H) P600 and slow wave (SW) Sources.
sLORETA maps shown for left medial (top) and ventral (bottom) cortical surfaces. OT, occipitotemporal cortex; AIT, anterior inferior temporal cortex; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex, including precuneus and cuneus. Estimated intracranial ERPs plotted for the voxel showing maximum impoverished-real-object effects from 300 to
400ms (same as later) in OT (55, −45, −25), 500 to 700ms in AIT (25, 0 −45), and 700 to 900ms in PCC (0 −55, 65). (E) Late impoverishment sources for real
objects. AIT sources (maximum BA 20, 25–30 −5 −45) occurred from 450 to 700ms when the P600 peaks: middle (BA 21, 65 −30 −20) and inferior temporal (BA
20, 60 −35 −20), fusiform (BA 20, 55 −35 −25), parahippocampal (BA 36, 35 −25 −30; BA 35, 30 −25 −25), and other limbic structures (BA 20, 25 0 −45; BA 38,
25 5 −45; BA 36, 25 −5 −40; BA 28, 25 −10 −35). From 500 to 700ms, limbic lobe dominated (BA 20/38, 25 0 −45), including parahippocampal gyrus (BA 35, 25
−15, −30). From 700 to 900ms, impoverishment effects in anterotemporal cortex continued and appeared in medial posterior cortex around cingulate (BA 25, 0 5
−10; BA 31, −10 −45 40), cuneus (BA 17, 5 −100 −5), and precuneus (BA 7, 5 −60 65; −5 −50 50), and occipital extrastriate regions (BA 18, 0 −95 −15). The SW
effect in PCC is active after 700ms. (F) Late impoverishment sources for pseudo objects. P600-like wave in AIT and SW in PCC shown. (G) Late object type sources
for LI, and (H) for MI: Occipitotemporal cortex only.
Discussion
Altogether, a hybrid account that combines the MUSI
framework, parietal-prefrontal PHT theories of vision, and
decision theories best explains the ﬁndings (Table 1 Results).
Overall, the ERP time course indicates that knowledge and
impoverishment modulate ERPs from 200 to 900ms, all of which
show the impoverished-real-object eﬀect: the N3, centroparietal
N400, parietal P600, and a late SW; note, as eﬀects on the LPC
were not distinguishable from the P600 and SW, henceforth
we do not discuss the LPC. Earlier ERPs and later ERPs from
900 to 1400ms provide no evidence of this eﬀect, and later
ERPs correlate with RTs and reﬂect supplementary motor cortex
activity.
Early ERPs before 200ms
Early ERPs are most consistent with the MUSI framework. Early
ERPs before 200ms show no impoverishment nor impoverished-
real-object eﬀects. Before 200ms, there was no evidence that
impoverishment aﬀects activation of object knowledge, and the
VPP/N170 showed only a small type eﬀect (Table 1). However,
a type eﬀect would likely reﬂect low-level feature diﬀerences
due to using a subset of pseudo versions of the real objects in
order to keep decision rates around 50%; in contrast, prior work
compared the full set of matched real and pseudo objects across
two experiments and three tasks, ﬁnding no ERP diﬀerences
until after 175ms and none on the VPP/N170 (Schendan
et al., 1998). More important, the VPP/N170 showed no
impoverishment eﬀect and no impoverished-real-object eﬀect;
note, sensory diﬀerences between MI and LI stimuli may have
been too small and variable to be detected here. Thus, we
found no evidence for early impoverishment eﬀects, and only
a small type eﬀect likely reﬂecting spurious low-level sensory
diﬀerences due to not using the full set of matched stimuli
here. Other studies have also not found early impoverishment
eﬀects with these fragmented line drawings, even when level is
held constant (e.g., Doniger et al., 2000; Schendan and Kutas,
2002; Schendan and Maher, 2009). With overall no evidence for
early impoverishment and type eﬀects independently, it is thus
not surprising to ﬁnd no evidence for an early impoverished-
real-object eﬀect. We are thus conﬁdent that early eﬀects of
impoverishment, type, and their interaction are minimal to none,
in general.
Note, early top-down models that involve biasing attention
(Figure 1F) assume a cue, context, or target determines task-
relevant information, whereas the present task provided no such
biasing signal, minimizing such top-down inﬂuences early on
and consistent with no such evidence here. In real life, context
may provide cues about object identity, but, when objects are
categorized in scene contexts, similar to real life situations,
the N3 complex shows the earliest context eﬀect, not earlier
ERPs (Ganis and Kutas, 2003). Possibly only strong, eﬀortful,
strategic biased attention would aﬀect early visual processing, as
when people visualize features mentally and eﬀortfully before the
picture appears, early VPP/N170 modulation is observed (Ganis
and Schendan, 2008) and could be expected to be enhanced by
impoverishment.
Late ERPs after 200ms
Together, both early and later ERPs indicate that object cognition
starts after initial bottom-up activation of the ventral stream.
Only the MUSI framework, not other vision or decision theories,
can explain this pattern. The rest of the discussion thus focuses on
later eﬀects and interpretation based on the full ERP time course.
While early ERPs best ﬁt the predictions of the MUSI framework,
later ERPs best ﬁt the predictions of parietal-prefrontal PHT
theories, though MUSI, decision, and prefrontal theories can
accommodate the results (Table 1). Thus, a hybridMUSI account
that combines MUSI with parietal-prefrontal PHT and decision
theories best explains the ﬁndings.
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FIGURE 9 | Late ERP slow waves (SW) show main effects of
impoverishment and object type after 900ms until response, localize
to supplementary motor area (SMA), and correlate with RT effects. (A)
Grand average ERPs show effects of impoverishment (more [MI], less [LI]
impoverished) and object type. ERPs at lateral sites of the SW (11–12), a
posterior slow wave (pSW; 51–52), and type effects (21–22) are plotted
negative up. Image type and impoverishment modulated distinct ERPs even
after 900 and until the latest responses around 1400ms for MI pseudo
objects. An impoverished-real-object effect on a late pSW started after 900ms
(gray line). (B) Voltmap generated using sLORETA (default left mastoid
reference) shows the distribution of voltage differences over the left
hemisphere from 1100 to 1400ms when only the SMA effect occurs; the
distribution is similar from 900 to 1100ms. Electrodes symbolized by half
spheres. The + sites are where the pSW effect is strongest (MI - LI),
whereas—sites are the location of the SW over frontal scalp (LI - MI). (C)
Across subjects, the RT difference correlated significantly with the
(Continued)
FIGURE 9 | Continued
late pSW effect. Each diamond plots the RT and ERP values for each subject.
RT difference on x-axis. ERP amplitude difference on y-axis. The computed
linear regression line (solid) is shown. Impoverishment difference for real
objects (MI minus LI) from 900 to 1100ms at site 51 correlated such that, on
MI relative to LI trials, as the pSW became more positive, RTs got slower. (D)
Maps from sLORETA for 900 to 1100ms on the left (L) medial surface show
the late SMA (BA 6, −15 −10 55; 5 −5 65) impoverishment effect for real
objects, extending into anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 24, −15 −10 50), and
estimated intracranial ERPs show the SMA effect started after 900ms.
Specifically, from 900 to 1100ms, sources of impoverishment effects for real
objects continued in striate/extrastriate and anterior temporal cortex, and, for
the first time, were located in left more than right SMA and anterior cingulate,
and this effect appeared to correspond to the pSW. From 1100 to 1400ms,
the SMA effect continued, but extended dorsally into superior frontal gyrus (BA
6, −10 [−10 or −15] 70), and posterior effects were minimal or none. At these
times, the impoverishment effect for pseudo objects localized to
striate/extrastriate areas (BA 17/18) with weaker sources in temporal pole (BA
38, −40 20 −35) and inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47, −50 45 −10). Note, the
sLORETA map shows estimated sources of the difference wave (MI - LI) in the
grand average ERPs superimposed on an inflated, canonical MNI152 brain
(Colin); dark areas represent sulci; light areas represent gyri. The depicted
brain shows standardized cortical current density distributions, and source
activity reflects the location of differential source activity between conditions
but not the direction of effects. Scale shows yellow represents maximal current
density value differences. Estimated intracranial ERPs from −100 to 1400ms
were extracted from the voxel showing maximum impoverished-real-object
effects at MNI coordinates from 900 to 1400ms in SMA (−10 −10 70). Solid
tics mark the 0ms stimulus onset and 400ms intervals post-stimulus.
Knowledge
Real objects activate knowledge more than pseudo objects so
type eﬀects reveal the time course of knowledge activation.
The frontal N3, N400, P600, and SW are more negative, and
occipitotemporal counterparts of the N3 are more positive
for real than pseudo objects, and these eﬀects localize to
occipitotemporal cortex. All these ERPs show type eﬀects for
LI stimuli, and N3 type eﬀects start at 230ms for LI stimuli.
Altogether, these results replicate evidence for knowledge eﬀects
with fully intact (i.e., LI) pictures of real and pseudo objects
on these ERPs, starting from 175 to 218ms during the N3 and
continuing onwards (Holcomb and McPherson, 1994; Schendan
et al., 1998; McPherson and Holcomb, 1999; Gruber and Müller,
2005, 2006).
While the MUSI account might seem counter to ultra-rapid
categorization and other early categorization ﬁndings before
150ms, they are actually compatible. Consider the following.
First, for example, eye movement ﬁndings (Kirchner and Thorpe,
2006) during ultra rapid categorization suggest an onset at
the earliest possible time of around 124ms when there are
more correct than wrong responses. This time matches the
120ms onset of categorical perception of objects and early object
perception processes on the VPP/N170 during State 1 (Schendan
et al., 1998; Schendan and Lucia, 2010). When behavior (e.g., a
saccade) can be performed based on information from the initial
bottom-up pass, then it will be carried out. However, this is a rare
occurrence. The same eye movement ﬁndings during ultra rapid
categorization suggest a mean minimum saccade RT of around
150ms, andmedian saccade RT of around 228ms, varying widely
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FIGURE 10 | ERP effects of impoverishment (by fragmentation level) and object type. Same as Figure 3, except impoverishment is defined using picture
fragmentation level: LI is levels 2–3; MI is levels 4–5. Results from this analysis replicate those in Figure 3 which used the median split of RTs to define impoverishment.
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between people, from 159 to 301ms. Thus while it is tempting
to focus on the onset, it is more informative for most visual
cognitive phenomena to realize that the fastest times represent
a special case of the minimum speed of initial (low-level) visual
feed forward processing that is suﬃcient to enable a decision and
motor response (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006). Most visual input
and task situations require more time. Indeed, even ultra rapid
categorization tasks pinpoint a typical onset of categorization
of 150–228ms or longer. In addition, longer time (e.g., 150–
230ms or longer) is associated with greater accuracy, even for
eye movements, and this additional time is thought to reﬂect
iterative (i.e., interactive, resonant) decision and motor processes
(Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006).
Second, as reviewed by Fabre-Thorpe (2011), rapid visual
categorization is associated with N3 eﬀects by 150ms
and minimal reaction time (MinRT) of 250 to 300ms for
superordinate categorizations in go-no go and two-category
decisions. The shortest time of 220ms can only be achieved
with extensive training, that is, on animal/non-animal decisions
with a single overlearned animal scene among novel scenes. No
set of easy, trivial, or optimal stimuli can explain this short RT,
and MinRT does not shorten even for the simplest geometric
images of square vs. circle. However, slower RTs are associated
with diﬃcult images, and experience can reduce these RTs
(Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001), consistent with greater repetition
priming eﬀects behaviorally and on the N3 and P600/LPC for
more than less impoverished categorized objects (Schendan and
Kutas, 2003). Altogether, the evidence has led to the conclusion
that the role of rapid visual categorization on behavior is limited
because it is based on “coarse and unconscious (achromatic)
visual representations automatically activated by the ﬁrst
available magnocellular information” that is processed along the
ventral visual pathway (Fabre-Thorpe, 2011). Notably, basic level
categorization (e.g., dog) yields slightly higher accuracy (4%)
than superordinate categorization (e.g., animal), and MinRT is
about 50ms slower (Fabre-Thorpe, 2011). This suggests that,
even at the fastest possible time, categorization at the basic
relative to superordinate level requires additional processing
time, which also achieves a higher decision accuracy. This is
consistent with the ﬁnding that entry level categorization of new
objects is typically associated with an N3 onset time around
200ms, and repetition priming can reduce this by about 50ms
down to around 150ms with canonical views, which are not
impoverished (Schendan and Kutas, 2003; Schendan and Maher,
2009).
Third, it remains open whether low level feature search can
explain the fastest times achieved. Ultra rapid categorization
involves giving the subject the category to search for beforehand,
making it essentially a visual search task (Treisman, 2006).
Hence, before the trial, the visual system has been placed in
a “top down presetting” state through feedback processes that
prepares it to detect the task relevant features of the category
(Enns, 2004; Fabre-Thorpe, 2011). Thus, if a feature of the
input matches the top-down search target by 120–150ms of
visual processing, then this can be used to execute a motor
behavior (i.e., a saccade), but this does not mean that entry level
categorization, meaning, phenomenological awareness, or object
cognition has yet occurred. All we know is that a sensori-motor
program has been executed within 120 to 150ms. The MUSI
argument is that state 1 may be suﬃcient for a simple sensori-
motor program to be executed based on categorical perception
or feature detection (as in visual search), but actual entry
level categorization, decision, cognition, and phenomenological
awareness do not happen until State 2. What is driving the fastest
times in ultra rapid categorization tasks is categorical perception,
not actual cognitive categorization. Indeed, it is thought that
the 120ms minimum time for the saccade behavior during ultra
rapid categorization tasks may be due to low level visual area
V4, bypassing higher order visual areas, such as inferotemporal
cortex, sending input directly to lateral inferior parietal cortex
and then to frontal eye ﬁelds. The earliest 120 to 150ms times
essentially reﬂect a low level sensorimotor decision that bypasses
semantics and even categorical perception, and “is just the start
of a series of complex events involving feedback loops. . . to
(generate) conscious perception” (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006):
This is essentially the interactive resonant activity posited in State
2 of the MUSI account.
Fourth, the VPP/N170 and earlier P1 and C1 are thought to
reﬂect predominantly the initial fast feedforward pass through
the visual system (e.g., Figure 1A), as well as reﬂexive feedback
(Figures 1B,C), whereas later ERPs are dominated by feedback
inputs (David et al., 2005, 2006). Thus feedback has the greatest
role in cognition after the initial bottom-up pass.
Fifth, the ERP that shows the earliest eﬀect in ultra-rapid
categorization studies is the N3 complex, not the VPP/N170,
and across a variety of ultra-rapid categorization studies the
N3 is modulated between about 150 and 500ms (Johnson and
Olshausen, 2003, 2005). Interestingly, the onset of the original
eﬀect was between 152 and 171ms (Thorpe et al., 1996).
This onset is consistent with ERP ﬁndings estimating when
entry level categorization starts, that is, between about 150 and
250ms, modulating the N3. For example, canonical and unusual
(impoverished) views of objects diﬀer between 140 and 250ms
(Schendan and Kutas, 2003), repetition eﬀects with canonical
(best) views of real objects start to modulate the N3 between 148
and 172ms (Schendan and Kutas, 2003), and repetition eﬀects for
fragmented drawings of real objects that are named correctly start
by 192ms (Schendan andMaher, 2009) or 248ms (Schendan and
Kutas, 2007a). Consistent with the MUSI account, the early part
of the N3 eﬀect from 190 to 215ms on ultra rapid categorization
tasks localizes to occipitotemporal cortex (Delorme et al., 2004;
Fize et al., 2005), and intracranial ERPs localize ERPs between
200 and 400ms to VLPFC and occipitotemporal cortex (Allison
et al., 1999; Puce et al., 1999).
Sixth, the N3 is the ﬁrst ERP that modulates with
categorization success, not the VPP/N170 (Schendan and
Kutas, 2002, 2003; Schendan and Maher, 2009). This
indicates that object cognition, entry level categorization,
and phenomenological awareness of the meaning of the object
do not start until feedback interactions dominate processing,
especially from anterior temporal or prefrontal cortex down to
occipitotemporal cortex, as indexed by the N3 (Lamme, 2003;
Schendan and Kutas, 2007a; Folstein and van Petten, 2008;
Schendan and Maher, 2009; Clarke et al., 2011). The N3 is
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 24 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1289
Schendan and Ganis Top-down categorization processes after 250ms
more negative with less successful category decisions, greater
top-down processes of mental imagery (Schendan and Lucia,
2009; Schendan and Ganis, 2012), greater image atypicality and
impoverishment (Doniger et al., 2000; Schendan and Kutas,
2002, 2003; Johnson and Olshausen, 2003), and for new relative
to repeated meaningful objects (i.e., repetition priming) (Henson
et al., 2004; Schendan and Maher, 2009; Voss et al., 2010). The
N3 typically inverts polarity somewhat over occipitotemporal
sites, where eﬀects are most prominent with a common average
reference (known as N250, Ncl, or L1) and associated with
category learning and implicit memory (Gruber and Müller,
2006; Scott et al., 2006; Sehatpour et al., 2006; Soldan et al., 2006).
Critically, ERPs and corresponding single-trial EEG and fMRI
show that category decision processes that distinguish between
faces and objects happen during the N3 complex in state 2 but
not on the earlier VPP/N170 in state 1 (Philiastides and Sajda,
2006, 2007; Philiastides et al., 2006; Ratcliﬀ et al., 2009; Rousselet
et al., 2011). On functional and spatiotemporal grounds, such
work suggests a D220 component of the N3 from 220 to 300ms
(Figures 3, 5A, 9, 11B) varies with impoverishment and task
diﬃculty and reﬂects anterior cingulate, eye ﬁeld, insula, and
dorsolateral prefrontal activity, and a so-called “late component”
of the N3 from 300 to 450ms reﬂects decision processes in
which VLPFC accumulates evidence from lateral occipital
cortex (Philiastides and Sajda, 2006, 2007). For example, the
N3 complex and both decision components have similar scalp
distribution patterns: Both invert polarity between similar frontal
and posterior locations. The role of prediction in visual search
(Enns and Lleras, 2008) is consistent with the present ﬁnding
that interactions or resonance between bottom-up and feedback
processes contributes to object constancy and the incorporation
of parietal-prefrontal PHT ideas into the MUSI account at
state 2.
Impoverishment and Knowledge
Knowledge activates around 230ms, and impoverishment and
impoverished-real-object eﬀects start around the same time
(∼250ms). These onsets are consistent with parietal-prefrontal
PHT theory ideas that, when initial bottom-up activation
(by ∼175–230ms) cannot categorize the object well enough to
make a decision about MI real objects (Serre et al., 2007a),
additional processes start to be recruited (∼250ms) that use
knowledge in posterior areas to achieve the visual constancy
of the category decision. Critically, impoverishment aﬀects real
objects the most; note, the ﬂip side of the interaction is that LI
stimuli activate knowledge the most eﬀectively. This timing is
consistent with the ﬁnding from category decision studies of a
∼50ms onset range of single trial EEG discrimination between
faces and cars when their phase coherence varies between 30
and 45% (Philiastides and Sajda, 2006). The fMRI and these
ERP results are compatible with both (a) top-down processes
in the parietal-prefrontal PHT variants (e.g., Ganis et al., 2007)
and (b) bottom-up accumulation in decision theories (e.g.,
Philiastides and Sajda, 2007).
However, only parietal-prefrontal PHT variants predict the
interaction (Table 1), and ﬁndings from ERP studies of mental
imagery indicate top-down processes operate after 200ms.
Mental imagery, which can be mediated only by top-down
processes, modulates both the N3 and SW but not the P600 and
minimally so the N400 (Schendan and Ganis, 2012). Moreover,
ERP mental imagery eﬀects resemble the spatiotemporal
characteristics and direction of the impoverishment eﬀects;
for example, the N3 and SW are most negative when the
need for top-down processes for mental imagery and when
impoverishment are greatest. In contrast, adaptation eﬀects,
which primarily reﬂect bottom-up processes, can show ERP
eﬀects in the opposite direction to mental imagery and
impoverishment eﬀects (Ganis and Schendan, 2008; Schendan
and Ganis, 2012). We thus conclude that the N3 impoverished-
real-object eﬀect reﬂects interactive top-down and bottom-up
activity that facilitates the category decision because only the N3
reﬂects visual object knowledge (as argued above) and shows the
expected pattern of knowledge, impoverishment, and decision
eﬀects across many studies that are predicted by PHT and
decision theories.
Accordingly, the N3 impoverishment eﬀects localize to lateral
prefrontal cortex (LPFC), and, for real objects only, localize
also to the same occipitotemporal region as knowledge activity.
This is consistent with the MUSI proposal that the N3 complex
reﬂects interactive activity between VLPFC and occipitotemporal
cortex for model selection from object knowledge. After 450ms,
the N400/P600 impoverishment eﬀects for real objects localize
to anterior inferior temporal cortex and the mediotemporal
lobe, consistent with intracranial studies showing memory eﬀects
in anterior mediotemporal lobe that resemble modulations of
late posterior positivities on the scalp (Halgren et al., 1995;
Guillem et al., 1999; Trautner et al., 2004). After 700ms, SW
impoverishment eﬀects for both object types localize to PCC. As
impoverished-real-object eﬀects and their implications change
over time, each ERP ﬁnding is next discussed in detail separately.
N3 complex
The N3 complex shows the earliest impoverishment and
impoverished-real-object eﬀects. These ﬁndings are consistent
with prior evidence of impoverishment or category decision
eﬀects on only later ERPs, not at earlier times before ∼150–
200ms (Doniger et al., 2000; Schendan and Kutas, 2002, 2003;
Johnson and Olshausen, 2003, 2005; Philiastides and Sajda, 2006,
2007; Philiastides et al., 2006; Sehatpour et al., 2006; Ratcliﬀ et al.,
2009; Schendan and Maher, 2009; Rousselet et al., 2011).
P250/N250 (D220)
The impoverished-real-object eﬀect starts on a frontopolar P250
component of the N3 complex, and this eﬀect inverts polarity
occipitotemporally, where it is larger with a common average
reference and modulates an N250 over the right hemisphere.
At this time, only real objects are more negative frontally
and more positive occipitotemporally for MI more than LI
stimuli. The P250/N250 indexes processes of model selection
from view-speciﬁc knowledge acquired based on prior experience
categorizing objects at the subordinate level (Schendan and
Kutas, 2003, 2007a; Scott et al., 2006). This knowledge also
supports entry level categorization (Schendan and Maher, 2009)
wherein the decision involves access to semantic memory about
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 25 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1289
Schendan and Ganis Top-down categorization processes after 250ms
30
34
4
22
47
53
12
51
N170
VPP
LOS
ITS
FG
COS
160
175120
LOS
vcIPS
TOS
100
115
115
130
120-200
N3
P250
P3(N3)
D220
N250
N400
VLPFC
TOS
vcIPS
VLPFC
LOS
ITS
FG
COS
200-500
parietal
P600 / LPC
pSW
200
ms−1 µV
400
ms
800
ms
RT
500-900
frontal
occipito-
temporal
central
occipito-
temporal
centro-
parietal
frontal
centro-
parietal
900-1400
1200
ms
State Final
LP Temporal
MPF
MPF
ACC
PCC
RetrosplenialCuneus
pre-
cuneus
SMA
SW
MI Pseudo
LI Pseudo
MI Real
LI Real
State 3
State 2
State 1
B  TIME COURSE & SUMMARY OF ERP RESULTSA  ANATOMY
FIGURE 11 | Multiple-state interactive (MUSI) theory and summary of results. Numerals indicate time in milliseconds (ms). (A) Brain regions contributing to
each state of cortical dynamics. Brain images in black box taken from impoverishment effects in fMRI studies of Ganis et al. (2007) for state 2 and dorsal stream of
state 1 and Schendan and Stern (2008) for all others. Note: Green arrow is feedback. Black arrow is bottom-up. State 1 axial slice shows object-sensitive areas.
VLPFC, ventral lateral prefrontal cortex; vcIPS, ventrocaudal intraparietal sulcus; TOS, transverse occipital sulcus; LOS, lateral occipital sulcus; ITS, inferotemporal
sulcus; FG, fusiform gyrus; COS, collateral sulcus; LP, lateral inferior parietal cortex; MPF, medial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; ACC, anterior
cingulate cortex; SMA, supplementary motor area. (B) Timing of cortical dynamics and summary of ERP and RT results. In state 1, the VPP/N170 in occipitotemporal
cortex (see A) shows no impoverished-real-object effect. In state 2, the N3 complex (including N300, P3, P250, D220, N250 components), indexing an interactive
network of occipitotemporal, occipitoparietal, and VLPFC regions (see A), shows the earliest impoverished-real-object effect. The later N400 also shows such an
effect. In state 3, the P600/LPC in temporal lobe parts of a default mode network (see A) shows a later impoverished-real-object effect; note, the sLORETA brain
source results from Figure 8E are copied here to show the location of P600/LPC effects. The latest such effect modulates an anterior slow wave (SW) in the PCC (see
A). Gray shading indicates time course of the brain source of the P600 and SW impoverishment effects. A final posterior SW (pSW; state final) correlates with RTs and
reflects SMA. Gray arrow points to mean RTs along ERP time course (same legend as for ERPs).
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meaning (Jolicoeur et al., 1984). The underlying processes have
roles in category learning, short-term repetition priming, and
working memory, and these ERPs have been found to localize
to areas (e.g., lateral occipital cortex) active also during the
VPP/N170, consistent with the present source estimation and the
MUSI account (Schweinberger et al., 2002; Foxe et al., 2005; Scott
et al., 2006; Sehatpour et al., 2006; Ganis and Schendan, 2008;
Schendan and Maher, 2009).
The P250/N250 is probably the same as a D220 observed
in decision research, as these ERPs have similar time courses
and scalp distributions. The D220 modulates with visual
impoverishment deﬁned by relative phase coherence of the image
and corresponding category decision accuracy, which has been
taken as a deﬁnition of task diﬃculty in the diﬀusion model
of decision making (Philiastides et al., 2006). However, the
present P250/N250 ﬁnding suggests that the D220 also shows
the impoverished-real-object eﬀect, arguing against a generic task
diﬃculty interpretation. Instead, the P250/N250 (D220) reﬂects
the interaction between decision processes, visual perception, and
memory (i.e., category knowledge). If the D220 was related only
to task diﬃculty, then it should also show an impoverishment
eﬀect for pseudo-objects, which it does not. In addition, the D220
is speciﬁc for decisions about the object’s category as opposed
to its color or episodic familiarity (Philiastides et al., 2006;
Schendan and Lucia, submitted) so access to category knowledge
is an integral part of the underlying neural processes. Relative
to category decisions, color decisions were considered easier
(Philiastides et al., 2006), but episodic recognition takes longer
and so can be considered harder. Nonetheless, the N3 complex,
including the D220, shows an impoverishment eﬀect for category
more than episodic memory decisions (Schendan and Lucia,
submitted). Further, color decisions do not automatically activate
category knowledge (Boucart and Humphreys, 1994; Pins et al.,
2004). Thus knowledge activation, not task diﬃculty, explains
why the D220 disappears when the task is color decision.
N3 significance
Altogether, the ﬁndings on the N3 complex indicate that PHT
and decision processes start around 250ms (i.e., the onset of
when impoverishment aﬀects knowledge activation) and lasts
until around 500ms post-stimulus onset. Impoverishment aﬀects
processing earlier for real than pseudo objects. For real objects,
impoverishment makes the frontal N3 complex more negative
from 250 to 450ms, whereas, pseudo objects show no such
eﬀect. These N3 ﬁndings are consistent with previous work
indicating that the frontopolar N3 varies with the success of
categorization and degree of mental rotation (Schendan and
Lucia, 2009; Schendan andMaher, 2009). They are also consistent
with the idea that the underlying process primarily detects the
relative match to stored information. Evidence indicates that the
N3 complex indexes model selection from object information
in occipitotemporal cortex based on the relative similarity of
the shapes and parts in a speciﬁc view, regardless of the
constituent small line segments, and working memory and long-
term perceptual priming modulate these processes (Holcomb
and McPherson, 1994; McPherson and Holcomb, 1999; Doniger
et al., 2000, 2001; Daﬀner et al., 2000b; Schendan and Kutas,
2002, 2003, 2007a; Henson et al., 2004; Gruber and Müller, 2006;
Sehatpour et al., 2006; Soldan et al., 2006; Ganis and Schendan,
2008). The neurophysiological processes underlying the N3,
perhaps especially frontopolar components, likely contribute
critically to processes of similarity evaluation for visual object
cognition. Testing processes in PHT theories require evaluating
the similarity of the spatial conﬁguration (i.e., location) of
features between object representations (e.g., between a predicted
model and a perceived object). After all, shape similarity
drives neural responses in monkey inferotemporal and human
occipitotemporal cortex, and is important for category learning
(Li et al., 1993; Rainer and Miller, 2000; Freedman et al., 2001,
2002, 2003; Sigala and Logothetis, 2002; Sigala et al., 2002;
Sigala, 2004; Jiang et al., 2007; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Op de
Beeck et al., 2008). Further, most categorization theories posit
a central role for evaluation of similarity, especially perceptual
similarity acquired through perceptual learning (Goldstone,
1994; Kruschke, 2008), and perceptual learning depends upon
processing to a point at which perceptual constancy is achieved
(Garrigan and Kellman, 2008).
N3 brain sources
Cortical source ﬁndings indicate that LPFC and occipitotemporal
cortex activate together during the N3 and the posterior
contribution includes knowledge-related processing, consistent
with top-down parietal-prefrontal PHT, decision, and MUSI
theories. While N3 impoverishment eﬀects localize to the LPFC,
regardless of knowledge, they also localize to occipitotemporal
cortex only for real objects from 255 to ∼450ms. By a
PHT account, impoverishment of real objects recruits LPFC,
which can succeed in modulating object knowledge stored
in occipitotemporal cortex, resulting in an impoverishment
eﬀect there as well. Impoverishment of pseudo objects also
recruits LPFC, but this has little or no modulatory inﬂuence
on occipitotemporal activity because, by design, these unknown
images activate knowledge minimally if at all. Intracranial ERPs
extracted from LPFC and occipitotemporal sources show that
these impoverished-real-object eﬀects start only after the bottom-
up pass (after ∼200ms). While source estimates are inherently
uncertain due to the inverse problem, our localizations ﬁt the
areas showing impoverished-real-object eﬀects in fMRI (Ganis
et al., 2007; Schendan and Stern, 2008) and are far distant from
each other and so spatially resolvable (Pascual-Marqui, 2002;
Wagner et al., 2004).
N400, P600, SW
Knowledge modulates the N3 and SW with both LI and MI
stimuli but the N400 and P600 only with LI stimuli. Because
subjects must activate knowledge in order to make a category
decision with both LI and MI stimuli, this ﬁnding pinpoints the
N3 and SW as candidates for reﬂecting the critical knowledge
activity. However, the anterior SW does not diﬀer between MI
unusual and LI canonical views (Schendan and Kutas, 2003) and
so is not a general impoverishment marker, and the SW does not
show repetition eﬀects with categorized real objects, as it should
if it reﬂects memory (Schendan and Maher, 2009). Thus, the N3
is only viable candidate for a neurophysiological marker of PHT
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and decision processes that mediate the impoverished-real-object
eﬀect.
Only ERPs from 400 to 700ms show a knowledge (type)
eﬀect only for LI stimuli. Thus, during the N400 and P600,
underlying semantic memory and decision evaluation processes,
respectively, take place for LI but not MI stimuli. In contrast,
the earlier N3 and later SW show knowledge eﬀects at both
impoverishment levels, though more for LI than MI, dissociating
late ERPs from each other. This dissociation between the N3 and
N400/P600 supports a dichotomy (Kousta et al., 2011) between
experiential (sensorimotor, aﬀect) knowledge, as indexed by the
N3 for vision, and linguistic (verbal) knowledge, indexed by the
N400, and later strategic evaluation of earlier category decision
processes and secondary higher-order semanticmemory analysis,
indexed by the P600/LPC (Schendan and Kutas, 2002; Sitnikova
et al., 2010).
While all later ERPs after 200ms show the impoverished-
real-object eﬀect, the exact pattern of the interaction diﬀers,
dissociating the meaning of these eﬀects. The N3 and N400
ﬁndings indicate that LI images of real objects activate
knowledge, including meaning, more strongly than MI images
of them. After all, the N3 and N400 show impoverishment
eﬀects for real objects only. In contrast, the P600 and SW
show impoverishment eﬀects also for pseudo objects. Indeed,
impoverishment aﬀects processing of pseudo objects for the
ﬁrst time only later, after 500ms on the P600 and SW. As
impoverishment eﬀects apply also to pseudo objects, which
cannot activate knowledge, this suggests that these latest eﬀects
to some extent reﬂect response related processes after the
category decision. Consistent with this, the P600 seems to index
evaluating how well or conﬁdently a task goal or memory
matching process has succeeded (Ruchkin and Sutton, 1978;
Schendan and Maher, 2009). The P600 is larger on LI than MI
trials because LI stimuli are more conﬁdently categorized than
MI stimuli, enhancing the P600 and related to faster RTs for
LI than MI stimuli. Accordingly, source ﬁndings indicate that
impoverished-real-object eﬀects during the P600 reﬂect post-
categorization processes in anterior inferior and mediotemporal
cortex related to evaluating the decision and memory match,
and, after 700ms during the SW, response planning related
processes in a PCC region. These regions show impoverished-
real-object eﬀects in fMRI, though PCC shows deactivation (i.e.,
more active for LI than MI) (Ganis et al., 2007; Schendan and
Stern, 2008). Altogether, the ERP time course indicates that larger
fMRI impoverishment activations for real (than pseudo) objects
reﬂect both earlier processes during the N3 and N400 and later
processes during the P600 and SW, whereas the smaller fMRI
impoverishment activations for pseudo objects reﬂect only later
processes after 500ms.
N400 linguistic knowledge
From 400 to 500ms, impoverishment modulates the
centroparietal N400, which is smallest for LI real objects relative
to all other conditions. The idea that name, semantic (i.e.,
indexed by N400), and object model (or “structural description,”
i.e., indexed by the N3) knowledge interact bidirectionally to
achieve visual object categorization and naming is consistent
with an interactive activation and competition model of object
naming (Humphreys et al., 1999) and the MUSI account.
By such accounts, the present ﬁnding of an impoverished-
real-object eﬀect on the N400 would indicate that interactive
computations among knowledge systems, including linguistic
semantic memory, also have a role in achieving visual constancy
of the cognitive decision. However, source ﬁndings suggest
only posterior contributions from occipitotemporal and
anterotemporal cortex. As no evidence was found for prefrontal-
posterior interactions during the N400, word-related semantic
memory may not contribute to perceptual hypothesis testing but
rather activates after the category decision.
P600
By the MUSI account, the P600 in state 3 reﬂects strategic
evaluation. P600 (or LPC) knowledge eﬀects may also in part
reﬂect stimulus categorization (Dien et al., 2004). The ∼50%
overall categorization rate conﬁrms that the ERP eﬀects do
not reﬂect diﬀerences in subjective probability of categorization
success associated with P3(00)-like ERPs (Polich and Bondurant,
1997). The P600 shows impoverishment eﬀects for the ﬁrst time
for both real and pseudo objects. The P600 is more positive for
LI than MI stimuli for real more than pseudo objects. The P600
eﬀect for real objects replicates the ﬁnding that the P600 is larger
to LI canonical than MI unusual views on categorization and
recognition (Schendan and Kutas, 2003; Schendan and Lucia,
submitted).
SW
After 700ms, a broadly distributed SW with a midline central
maximum diﬀers among all conditions. The SW impoverished-
real-object eﬀect manifests as greater positivity for LI real
objects relative to MI ones relative to LI pseudo objects relative
to MI ones. The SW seems to index processes related to
response execution and monitoring, being less positive when
these processes are more challenging (Schendan and Maher,
2009). After 700ms during the SW, impoverishment eﬀects
localize primarily to the PCC region that instead activates more
for LI than MI real objects in fMRI (Ganis et al., 2007; Schendan
and Stern, 2008). The PCC is part of a default mode network
for internal evaluation, exogenous attention, episodic memory
retrieval, and semantic memory computations with words that
is anticorrelated in fMRI with the active task network that
instead includes prefrontal and posterior processing areas that
underlie the N3 and N400 (Fox et al., 2005; Buckner et al.,
2008; Binder et al., 2009). The present time course would be
consistent with the idea that the active task network operates
from 200 to 500ms during the N3 and N400, whereas the P600
and SW reﬂect activity in the mediotemporal and PCC parts
of the default mode network, respectively. Intriguingly, after
700ms, real objects activate anterior and medial temporal cortex
and PCC, whereas pseudo objects activate only the PCC. This
suggests that knowledge in temporal cortex contributes to PCC
activity as part of default mode interactions with real objects but
not pseudo objects, which cannot activate knowledge. Because
the anterior and medial temporal cortex activity starts during
the P600, the same activity during the later SW likely reﬂects a
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continuation of the earlier posterior positivity and may best be
considered an LPC contribution to posterior ERPs after 500ms
(P600, SW).
Alternative Explanations
Not Subjective Probability
Subjective probability of categorized vs. uncategorized responses
cannot explain the results. Subjects were naïve that some objects
were not real (pseudo-objects) and so uncategorizable, and
categorized and uncategorized responses split about evenly: From
the subjects’ perspectives, any object, whether truly real or
pseudo, that did not belong to a known category was merely
an uncategorized object, and this happened about half the time,
making the task essentially a reliable and simple two-choice
decision between half categorized and half uncategorized images.
Not Early Motor Potentials
N3 eﬀects do not reﬂect earlier time courses of motor potentials
for LI than MI objects. (a) The N3 and RTs dissociate. The
N3 complex shows impoverished-real-object eﬀects well before
the earliest RT to LI real objects (∼650ms). Still, if the N3 is
merely a motor potential, a larger N3 should always be associated
with longer RTs. To the contrary, it has been found that, when
people categorize fragmented pictures of objects that have been
repeated (primed), the N3 is the same between all repetition
conditions, whereas RTs and other ERPs, such as the P600,
diﬀer between the various repeated conditions (Schendan and
Kutas, 2007a,b). Further, the N3 is larger when categorization
RTs are faster (instead of slower) for scrambled than intact
objects (Schendan and Lucia, 2010). (b) The N3 does not index
a motor readiness potential. The readiness potential (RP) is a
midline central negativity that is greater for contralateral than
ipsilateral responses by∼200ms post-stimulus due to diﬀerential
activity in primary motor cortex. The RP could make negativity
greater for MI than LI stimuli but cannot explain these N3
eﬀects. First, with a mastoid reference, as herein, the RP is
maximal over central midline (C3, C4) and absent at frontal
sites (F3, F4) (Kutas and Donchin, 1980) near the frontocentral
N3 and far from the frontopolar ERPs. Second, N3 and RP
waveforms diﬀer. The N3 impoverishment eﬀect and its LPFC
sources return to baseline by 500ms, which is ∼150ms before
the earliest RT. In contrast, the RP rises steadily over ∼500ms
preceding the RT (Coles, 1989). Third, no impoverishment eﬀects
were found in primary motor cortex in our N3 source estimates
and neuroimaging studies of model veriﬁcation (Kosslyn et al.,
1994; Ganis et al., 2007; Schendan and Stern, 2008). (c) N3
impoverishment eﬀects cannot merely be related to motor
planning. An impoverishment eﬀect in the supplementary motor
area was found in the fMRI version for fragmented pictures
(Ganis et al., 2007) but not for unusual vs. canonical views
(Kosslyn et al., 1994; Schendan and Stern, 2008). Only ventral
premotor cortex activity reﬂects a general process related to
image impoverishment with objects (unusual views, fragmented
pictures) (Ganis et al., 2007; Schendan and Stern, 2008) that
has been implicated in evidence accumulation for a decision
(Heekeren et al., 2008). Finally, note that N3 knowledge eﬀects
are unlikely to reﬂect diﬀerences in motor responses between
real and pseudo objects because similarly large N3 diﬀerences
have been found with the full set of these stimuli during passive
viewing when both object types were non-targets (Schendan
et al., 1998), but P600 (or LPC) knowledge eﬀects may in part
reﬂect stimulus categorization (Dien et al., 2004).
Late Motor Activity (pSW)
The most likely ERPs to include motor potentials are those
around the time of the response. Indeed, after 900ms, a posterior
slow wave (pSW) (Figure 9) modulates independently with type
and impoverishment but shows no evidence of impoverished-
real-object eﬀects. The pSW is more positive for real than pseudo
objects and for MI than LI trials, matches and correlates with
corresponding RT eﬀects, and localizes to SMA and nearby
anterior cingulate regions that show impoverishment eﬀects in
fMRI (Ganis et al., 2007). These sources are consistent with late
slow intracranial ERPs in premotor andmotor regions of epilepsy
patients (Halgren et al., 1994). However, the SMA region and
pSW ﬁndings do not reﬂect model veriﬁcation per se but rather
later processes related to generating a response under MI relative
to LI conditions because it was not speciﬁc for real objects,
and SMA shows no eﬀects of impoverishment by viewpoint
(Schendan and Stern, 2008).
Nonvisual Impoverishment Factors
The median split approach captures all possible factors that
contribute to the visual constancy of a category decision, but
using fragmentation level to deﬁne LI and MI conditions
yields the same pattern (Figure 10), demonstrating that
visuoperceptual factors were among those driving the eﬀects.
Further, impoverishment eﬀects here resemble those found when
fragmentation or viewpoint impoverishes the images (Doniger
et al., 2000; Schendan and Kutas, 2003). Future work will need to
tease apart each perceptual and cognitive factor using the times
and regions of interest deﬁned here.
Conclusion
Findings reveal the cortical dynamics to achieve visual constancy
of a category decision. The time course of knowledge,
impoverishment, and impoverished-real-object ﬁndings ﬁt best
a hybrid MUSI account that incorporates parietal-prefrontal
PHT theories and decision theories to explain the visual
constancy of object cognition. By such an account, for
MI objects, the initial bottom-up pass may fail to yield
a suﬃciently accurate decision, thereby recruiting prefrontal
cortex to send top-down modulatory inputs to occipitotemporal
object processing areas to accumulate more perceptual and
knowledge evidence for the decision. Critically, by examining
both impoverishment and knowledge factors, the ﬁndings
demonstrate that impoverishment adversely aﬀects activation
of knowledge (conveyed by real objects) more than merely
perceptual processing of any object (including pseudo objects) by
∼250ms after seeing an image. Convergent evidence, including
from studies of the top-down processes for mental imagery,
lead to the conclusion that, during the N3 complex, top-
down processes posited in parietal-prefrontal PHT and decision
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theories recruit LPFC to modulate not only perceptual evidence
coming from posterior object processing areas but also the
activation of knowledge in those areas. This happens after the
initial bottom-up activation of object processing areas.
Altogether these ﬁndings suggest the following hybrid
MUSI account, which incorporates parietal-prefrontal PHT
and decision theories, to explain the cortical dynamics for
the visual constancy of object cognition (Figure 11). State 1
during the VPP/N170 between 120 and 200ms involves initial,
bottom-up activation of ventral object processing cortex. Starting
∼230ms (state 2), model selection based on both visual input
and memory (e.g., knowledge) for a decision starts during a
second state of interactive bottom-up, recurrent, and feedback
(reﬂexive top-down) activity among object processing areas
in occipitotemporal cortex and VLPFC, indexed by the N3
complex. When visual input is highly impoverished, top-down
processes of PHT in parietal and LPFC areas, especially VLPFC
regions, can modulate occipitotemporal activity to facilitate the
visual object constancy of a decision, achieving accuracy at a
cost of longer response times. Any impoverished image can
recruit PHT processes, but these processes modulate knowledge-
related computations in occipitotemporal cortex only when the
image depicts a real object. Based on convergent evidence,
we propose that top-down processes for PHT are recruited
based on the shape similarity among perceived object(s) and
stored models (i.e., match between percept and knowledge),
which decreases as image impoverishment increases. Also in
state 2, during a centroparietal N400 from 400 to 500ms,
interactive activation of linguistic (verbal) knowledge (e.g., the
name) happens in temporal cortex. Later after ∼500ms (state
3), anterotemporal cortex during the P600/LPC and posterior
cingulate activity during a broad slow wave (SW), perhaps in the
default mode network for internal evaluation of prior processing
and memory activation, and secondary higher-order semantic
memory. Finally, after 900ms (in a ﬁnal response state), SMA
and anterior cingulate activity, indexed by a posterior slow
wave correlated with RTs, plans the execution of the motor
response.
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